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Chapter 1 
Damages in Lieu of Performance Because of 
Breach of Contract 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In contract disputes between transnational contracting parties, damages are often awarded 
to compensate a claimant for loss, injury or detriment resulting from a respondent’s failure to 
perform the agreement.  In fact, damages may be the principal means of substituting for 
performance or they may complement other remedies, such as rescission or specific 
performance. 
 Damages for breach of contract typically serve to protect one of three interests of a 
claimant: (1) performance interest (also known as expectation interest); (2) reliance interest; or 
(3) restitution interest.  The primary goal of damages in most jurisdictions is to fulfill a 
claimant’s performance interest by giving the claimant the substitute remedy of the “benefit of 
the bargain” monetarily.  This typically includes compensation for actual loss incurred as a result 
of the breach and for net gains, including lost profits, that the claimant was precluded from 
realizing because of the respondent’s actions. 
 All legal systems place limitations on damage awards.  The most common limitations are 
causation, foreseeability, certainty, fault, and avoidability.  In order to obtain damages, there 
must be a causal connection between the respondent’s breach and the claimant’s loss.  In 
2addition, the claimant must show that the loss was foreseeable or not too remote.  Further, the 
claimant is required to show with reasonable certainty the amount of the damage.  Many civil 
law countries also require, as a prerequisite to an award of damages for breach of contract, that 
the respondent be at fault in breaching the agreement.  Damages may also be limited by the 
doctrine of avoidability, which provides that damages which could have been avoided without 
undue risk, burden, or humiliation are not recoverable.   
 It also should be noted at the outset that parties may agree upon the remedies available 
for breach of contract.1 For example, they may limit the scope of liability in the event that a 
party terminates the contract because of certain events.  In addition, they may include a 
liquidated damages provision, which provides for a specified amount of damages to be paid by a 
party who repudiates the agreement.  However, some jurisdictions may refuse to enforce such a 
clause, particularly if the amount to be paid in liquidated damages is grossly disproportionate to 
the actual loss or loss that could reasonably arise under the circumstances.2
The rules concerning damages for breach of contract are complex and vary greatly from 
country to country.  Furthermore, in some federal countries, such as the United States and 
Canada, the applicable rules differ among states and provinces.  This study thus surveys only the 
general rules concerning damages awarded in lieu of performance because of a breach of 
contract (“performance damages”).3 It begins with an overview of the purposes served by 
awarding damages.  It then examines performance damages for breach of contract in common 
law and civil law countries.  The study subsequently analyzes the awarding of damages under the 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which applies to “a sales contract 
between a buyer and seller, each of which has its place of business in different countries that are 
a party to the Convention, unless the buyer and seller provide otherwise.”4 Finally, the study 
3discusses the awarding of  damages under general principles of law and principles of equity and 
fairness. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PURPOSES OF DAMAGES 
Damages for breach of contract in civil and common law jurisdictions have a common 
source, the Roman law principle casum sentit dominus – that each person bears his or her own 
accidental damages.5 In addition, in most civil and common law jurisdictions, damages are 
designed to protect one or more of the following three interests: performance, reliance and 
restitution. 
 Performance Interest. The usual goal of damages is to put the claimant  in the position 
that it would have been in had the contract been performed; that is, to give the claimant the 
“benefit of the bargain.”6 This is known as  performance or expectation interest.7 Damages for 
performance interest may involve claims for three types of loss: direct loss, incidental loss, and 
consequential loss.  Direct loss is the loss in value to the claimant that results from the failure of 
the respondent to perform its contractual obligations.  It is typically measured by the market 
value of the benefit of which the claimant has been deprived through the breach, or the costs of 
reasonable measures to bring about the situation that would have existed had the contract been 
properly performed.  In some circumstances, a breach of contract may cause a claimant to incur 
additional costs in an attempt to avoid further loss.  These expenses are referred to as incidental 
loss.  For example, in the case of a breach by a seller, incidental damages may include the costs 
incurred in preserving or storing goods that have been delivered late, or goods that are defective 
and are to be returned to the seller.  A breach of contract may not only cause a claimant to suffer 
direct and incidental losses, but it may also cause a claimant to suffer losses from dealing with 
third parties, which is called consequential loss.  For example, in the case of a breach by a buyer, 
4a seller may suffer consequential damages resulting from the termination of contracts with 
suppliers, or fees resulting from a dishonored check.  The circumstances under which claimants 
may recover damages for direct, incidental and consequential loss vary among jurisdictions. 
 Reliance Interest. Reliance interest attempts to put the claimant in the position the 
claimant would have been in had the contract never been made.8 There are two types of reliance 
interest: essential reliance and incidental reliance.9 Essential reliance allows recovery for 
preparation and performance under the agreement, while incidental reliance allows recovery for 
preparations for collateral transactions that were to occur when the contract at issue was to have 
been performed.  However, reliance interest generally does not include lost opportunities to 
make other contracts. Unlike performance interest, the burden may be placed on the respondent 
to prove that the claimant’s expenses would have been incurred even if the contract had not been 
breached. 
 Restitution Interest. The object of restitution interest is to return or to restore to the 
claimant the gain or benefit that the respondent received as a result of the breach of the contract.   
Basically, it prevents unjust enrichment of the respondent.  Thus, the focus is not upon the 
claimant, but upon the breaching party.  Restitution interest requires the respondent to turn over 
to the claimant any benefit that the respondent received because of the respondent’s failure to 
perform the contract.  Damages for restitution interest are typically smaller than for performance 
interest or reliance interest because restitution interest does not include the claimant’s lost profit 
or expenditures made in reliance on the contract that did not confer a benefit on the respondent.  
Restitution may be an appropriate remedy for breach of an unenforceable contract.10 
The following example illustrates recovery of damages under the various interests.  
Suppose a company from country A (the claimant) enters into a contract to build a water bottling 
5plant with a company in country B (the respondent) for US$10 million.  Assume that it will cost 
the claimant US$8 million to build the facility, thus earning a US$2 million profit.  Also assume 
that, immediately after the contract is executed and before the claimant has spent any resources 
on the project, the respondent intentionally repudiates the agreement.  In this circumstance, the 
claimant’s performance interest is US$2 million, which is the amount needed to put the claimant 
in the position it would have been in had the contract been performed.  The reliance interest is 
US$0 because the claimant has incurred no expenses in reliance prior to the repudiation of the 
agreement.  Similarly, the restitution interest is US$0 because the respondent has not been 
unjustly enriched.  Assume instead that the respondent does not repudiate the agreement until 
after the claimant has spent US$5 million on the project and the facility, in its unfinished state, is 
now worth US$1 million (at the time of breach).  The claimant’s performance interest is now 
US$7 million11 because this is the sum needed to give the claimant the benefit of the bargain.  By 
contrast, the claimant’s reliance interest is US$5 million and the restitution interest is US$1 
million. 
III. SURVEY OF NATIONAL LAWS 
A. Europe 
1. Common Law System 
In England, an award of damages is the usual remedy for breach of contract.12 The 
purpose of such damages is not to punish the respondent, but rather to place the party who has 
sustained a loss, in so far as money can do it, in the same situation as if the contract had been 
performed.13 That is, damages are compensatory, commonly awarded to protect a claimant’s 
performance interest.14 
6Common law systems classify damages for breach of contract into three types:  nominal, 
general and special.  Nominal damages may be awarded when the respondent is liable for a 
breach of contract, but the claimant is unable to prove any actual damages.15 General damages 
are those that result from the infringement of a legal right or duty.  They are characterized as the 
natural and probable consequences of the particular breach and include both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary losses.16 Special damages, on the other hand, are pecuniary losses precisely 
quantifiable at the date of the trial, such as expenses, loss of earnings and loss of profits.  Special 
damages arise out of special and extraordinary circumstances.17 
English courts have drawn a number of other distinctions between general and special 
damages.  Special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved in order to be awarded.18 
By contrast, general damages are recoverable without proof of loss19 so that it need only be 
“averred that such damage has been suffered.”20 Special damages, unlike general damages, also 
cannot be claimed in contract suits, “unless such damages were within the contemplation of both 
parties at the time of the contract.”21 
Damages for mental distress are typically not awarded in breach of contract actions, 
unless such damages were within the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into 
the contract.22 For example, damages for mental distress may be recovered if the object of the 
contract was to provide peace of mind or freedom from distress.23 
Damages for breach of contract to pay money are normally limited to the amount of the 
debt together with such interest from the time when it became due.24 Similarly, the cost of 
raising the money elsewhere may be recoverable as a natural result of a breach of contract to 
lend money.25 In addition, whether a contract is to pay or lend money, where the circumstances 
7are such that a special loss is foreseeable at the time of the making of a contract, damages may be 
recoverable for that loss.26 
Sale of Goods. The law governing remedies for breach of contract involving the sale of 
goods is codified in the English Sale of Goods Act of 1979.  The Act divides the remedies 
available depending on whether the claimant is a seller or buyer.  Under the Act, a seller has an 
action for the contract price where the buyer has failed to pay for goods after taking delivery or 
after a specified day.27 In addition, a seller has a right to damages where the buyer has wrongly 
refused to take delivery of goods.28 The measure of damages “is the estimated loss directly and 
naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events.”29 A market is typically available in the sale 
of goods.  In that case, a seller’s damages are measured by the difference between the contract 
price and market price at the time at which delivery should have taken place.30 In a falling 
market, which might possibly encourage a buyer to breach, a seller may be forced to resell the 
goods at a price lower than the contract price.  By allowing the seller to recover the difference 
between the contract and market price, the Act theoretically places the seller in the same position 
the seller would have been in had the contract been performed. 
 In the case of a seller’s breach of contract, a buyer’s damages are measured the same way 
as the seller’s damages.  The buyer is compensated for any losses it suffered which were the 
direct and natural result of the seller’s breach.31 When there is a market available for the goods, 
damages are assumed to be equal to the difference between the contract price and the market 
price at the time delivery should have been made.32 This enables buyers to receive the “benefit 
of the bargain” and, if forced to purchase more expensive goods on the market, the buyer can 
recover the difference between the more expensive goods and the goods for which it contracted.  
In cases where the seller breached the contract under a breach of warranty, the buyer may 
8maintain an action for damages.33 Damages are generally measured by the difference in value 
between the defective goods and the contracted for goods.34 This essentially compensates buyers 
for any gain of which they have been deprived by receiving inferior goods. 
 Buyers of goods are often involved in contracts with third parties for the resale of the 
goods, presumably at a profit.  This raises the issue of whether those lost profits are recoverable 
as damages.35 
Requirements and Limitations. Common law jurisdictions impose several requirements 
and  limitations on damages for breach of contract.  These include:  (a) a claimant may only 
recover loss that was directly caused by the respondent; (b) a claimant may only recover for loss 
that was foreseeable as a probable result of the breach of contract; (c) a claimant may not recover 
for loss that could have been avoided; and (d) a claimant may only recover for loss that can be 
proved with reasonable certainty.36 
Causation/Foreseeability. In most common law jurisdictions, in order to receive 
damages for breach of contract a causal connection must exist between the claimant’s loss and 
the respondent’s breach of contract.37 Thus, the issue becomes whether the respondent’s breach 
was so connected with the claimant’s loss or damage that “as a matter of ordinary common sense 
and experience it should be regarded as the cause of it.”38 Typically, the claimant is required to 
show that, if the respondent had not breached the contract, the claimant could have performed its 
obligations under the agreement. 
 If the breach of contract is one of two causes, both co-operating and both of equal 
efficacy, sufficient causation exists.  However, causation may be negated by “the voluntary act 
of a third person intervening between the breach of the contract by the [respondent] and the loss 
suffered by the [claimant].”39 
9Even if the claimant is able to show that the respondent’s breach of contract caused the 
claimant’s loss, the claimant must still show that the damage is not too remote.  In general, 
common law jurisdictions limit the recovery of damages to losses which were within the 
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made or foreseeable as a probable result of 
the breach.  This concept of foreseeability originates from the Court of Exchequer’s landmark 
decision in Hadley v. Baxendale.40 
In Hadley, a miller contracted with carriers to deliver a broken shaft to a manufacturer for 
repair.  The carriers failed to deliver the shaft to the manufacturer by the time to which they had 
agreed.  This resulted in the miller having to delay the reopening of the mill.  The miller then 
sued the carriers for the profits he would have made had the mill been able to resume operations 
without the delay.  The court held that the loss of profits was not recoverable because the facts 
known to the carrier were not sufficient to “show reasonably that the profits of the mill must be 
stopped by an unreasonable delay in the delivery of the broken shaft by the carriers to the third 
person.”41 The court explained: 
We think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this:  where two parties 
have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other 
party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may 
fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. according to the 
usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may 
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the 
time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.  Now, if the 
special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were 
communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, 
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the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would 
reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily 
follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and 
communicated.  But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were 
wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be 
supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would 
arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special 
circumstances, from such a breach of contract.  For, had the special circumstances 
been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract 
by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be 
very unjust to deprive them.  Now the above principles are those by which we 
think the jury ought to be guided in estimating the damages arising out of any 
breach of contract.42 
There are thus two main principles of Hadley. First, a loss is recoverable if it can be said 
to flow naturally from certain breaches of contract.43 Second, if a loss does not flow naturally 
from the breach, it must be shown that the respondent possessed such knowledge that would 
enable an ordinary person, at the time of entering into the contract, to foresee that extraordinary 
loss would ensue from a breach of contract.44 The main significance of these rules is to limit the 
availability of recovery of compensation for anticipated profits and consequential damages.45 
This test of foreseeability covers both general and special damages.  This determination is 
evaluated in light of the special knowledge that the respondent possessed (actual knowledge) as 
well as any knowledge it should have possessed (imputed knowledge).  Thus, both an objective 
(reasonable person) and a subjective (in light of the facts known) standard is applied.  In 
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addition, the ability of a breaching party to foresee damages is evaluated at the time the contract 
was made.46 
In England, a slightly different limitation of foreseeability applies with regard to the sale 
of goods.  Section 50(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 provides:  “[t]he measure of damages is 
the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the 
buyer’s breach of contract.”47 
Certainty. Damages must also be proven with reasonable certainty.48 The certainty rule 
applies only to the fact of damages, not to the amount of damages.49 Thus, if the claimant 
provides sufficient evidence of loss or damage, the fact that the amount of damages is difficult to 
assess is generally no bar to recovery.50 Damages can be uncertain for a variety of reasons.  
There can be uncertainty as to how to measure the loss.51 Or, it can be uncertain that a loss will 
occur from a breach of contract, such as the loss of profits due to a breach of contract.  
Accordingly, courts in common law countries have been willing to award damages for lost 
profits and the loss of a chance.52 
The classic example of a court awarding damages for loss of chance is Chaplin v. 
Hicks.53 In Chaplin, a woman was denied the opportunity to compete in a beauty contest with 
fifty other contestants for the chance to win one of twelve acting contracts.  The organizer of the 
contest unsuccessfully argued that the woman’s loss of chance was incapable of assessment.  
Instead, the court held for the beauty contestant and denied that “the mere fact that it is 
impossible to assess the damages with precision and certainty relieves a wrongdoer from paying 
any damages in respect of the breach of a duty of which he has been guilty.”54 The court ruled 
that the beauty contestant’s chance of winning was something to which a monetary value could 
be assigned.  The court reasoned that if the beauty contestant had tried to sell her position as one 
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of the fifty beauty contestants in the running for twelve possible acting contracts, an individual 
could have bought it from her for a fixed price.  With respect to damages, the court let stand the 
jury’s decision to award the beauty contestant 100 pounds.  In doing so, it noted that the beauty 
contestant, as one of fifty contestants competing for twelve prizes, was entitled to damages equal 
to roughly one quarter of the potential prize money.55 
Avoidability. In England, a claimant may be precluded from recovering damages for loss 
that the claimant could have avoided through appropriate measures.56 The purpose of this 
principle is to preclude wastefulness on the part of the claimant at the expense of the 
respondent.57 It is important to point out that this principle does not impose a positive duty on 
the claimant.  In other words, there is no affirmative “duty to mitigate,” as the failure to mitigate 
would not result in liability.  Rather, the failure to take the appropriate mitigation measures 
precludes the recovery of damages that could have been avoided.58 Typically, the burden is on 
the respondent to prove that the claimant failed to take the appropriate mitigation measures.59 
Claimants need not “do anything other than in the ordinary course of business,”60 or take steps 
that would subject them to “undue risk, burden or humiliation,” including steps that would injure 
their commercial reputation.61 
What constitutes appropriate mitigation varies depending on the circumstances.  In 
general, a claimant must “take all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent on the 
breach.”62 The duty to mitigate, however, arises only after claimants have accepted the 
repudiation by the breaching party.63 In some cases, a claimant need not “mitigate loss, even 
after the [respondent’s] performance of the contract which he has repudiated falls due, by 
accepting the repudiation and suing for damages.”64 Once claimants accept the breach of 
contract they are “debar[red] . . . from claiming any part of the damage which is due to [their] 
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neglect to take such steps.”65 In other words, the failure to mitigate results in damages being 
calculated as if the claimant did not act reasonably to minimize its loss.66 If the claimant takes 
steps to mitigate its loss, the claimant may recover loss or expense incurred in reasonably 
attempting to do so, even where the mitigating steps in fact led to greater loss.67 
2. Civil Law Systems 
In civil law jurisdictions, the law of contracts is codified in the law of obligations (the 
civil code) or in the commercial code.68 However, it is important to point out at the outset that, 
in contrast to common law countries, specific performance is at least in theory a preferred 
remedy in civil law systems.69 In the new German Statute on Modernisation of the Law of 
Obligations, damages may be sought only if certain conditions are met.70 In other systems, such 
as France, courts have discretionary power over the appropriate remedy and may order the 
payment of damages instead of specific performance, even where the latter is possible, especially 
if the claimant prefers damages.71 
Civil law systems base an award of damages on two Roman law concepts of 
compensation.72 The first is known as damnum emergens, which is compensation for actual 
losses suffered.  For example, where a contract to build a house is breached, the 
contractor/claimant  may seek to recover damages for the value of the wood that it purchased 
from a lumber yard.  The second concept is known as lucrum cessans, which is net gains 
prevented.  This concept relates to the expectation of putting the bargained for performance to 
good use.  For instance, in the above example, the claimant may also claim damages for the 
profit it would have made from building the house.  Damnum emergens and lucrum cessans are 
sometimes described as being equivalent to reliance and performance interest measures.  
However, such a characterization can be misleading.  Lucrum cessans is necessarily a 
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performance interest loss.  Conversely, damnum emergens may be either a reliance or 
performance interest loss.73 For instance, in a contract for the sale of goods, the damnum 
emergens may be measured by the difference between the contract price and the market price, 
which also represents the performance interest.74 In any event, the distinction between reliance 
and performance interest typically is only useful in common law; in France, at least, such a 
distinction is not made.75 
Some civil law jurisdictions classify damages for breach of contract into two categories 
called positive interest and negative interest.76 The purpose of positive interest is to place the 
claimant in the financial position it would have been in had the contract been performed.  This 
amount may include any profits it would have received if the breach had not occurred.  By 
contrast, the purpose of negative interest is to restore the claimant to the position it would have 
been in had the transaction not taken place.  That is, it furthers the claimant’s reliance interest.77 
Some civil law countries also allow non-pecuniary damage to be claimed, which is 
known as moral damage.78 Moral damages are damages occurring from “intangible injury to 
feelings, honor, or moral principles, causing pain or suffering.”79 In France, for example, a court 
awarded an actress damages for harm to her reputation after a theater failed to put her name in 
letters of the agreed size.80 Other countries, such as Germany, do not usually allow recovery for 
moral damage.81 
In general, damages “constitute a substitute for performance, that is, full compensation 
for the loss resulting from the breach of contract.”82 Thus, many civil codes provide that a 
claimant may recover for the loss incurred (damnum emergens) and for the gain of which it was 
deprived (lucrum cessans).83 This awards claimants the “benefit of the bargain,” essentially 
awarding claimants their performance interest.84 The goal is the same as in common law, to put 
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claimants in the position they expected to be in had the contract been performed.  Depending on 
the jurisdiction, it is often important under civil law to characterize various breaches of contract.  
While French law treats breaches the same way common law does, by comprehensively grouping 
them together, other countries categorize the various types of breach.85 In Austria, breaches of 
contract are categorized into impossibility, delay, breach of warranty and positive violation.  The 
available remedies depend on the type of breach.86 For example, in the case of delayed 
performance, where performance is late but still possible, damages are available when the delay 
is due to the obligor’s fault.87 
Not every breach of contract enables the injured party to rescind the contract.  The breach 
must be material.  Each country approaches this requirement differently.  In Italy, rescission will 
not be granted if the breach has only “slight importance” to the other party’s interest.88 In 
France, courts have wide discretion in granting a rescission of a contract and damages (known as 
a résolution of a contract) by looking at the level of the breach and whether or not damages 
would be adequate.89 German law provides separate standards for the right to terminate, but 
generally requires a serious breach.90 In Switzerland, a party can terminate a contract if the 
obligor failed to perform after having been given an additional time for performance.91 
In contracts which involve the payment of a sum of money, damages are often expressly 
spelled out in civil codes as limited to the sum and interest.92 There is also no requirement that 
the claimant show proof of loss.93 
Sale of Goods. In sale of goods cases in civil law countries, like in common law 
countries, different methods exist for determining the value of a claimant’s damages.  The first is 
the “concrete” method,94 where damages equal the difference between the contract price and the 
price the buyer paid in a substitute contract.95 The second is the “abstract” method, where no 
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substitute transaction has taken place and damages equal the difference between the contract 
price and the market price at the time substitute goods could have been obtained.  In the case of 
breach by buyers, “concrete” refers to the actual resale price, and “abstract” refers to the market 
price.96 It is worth noting that, in France, the injured party to a sale must obtain a court order 
before it can go into the market for substitute goods.97 
Where goods have been delivered but are defective, civil law countries allow the buyer to 
reduce the price of the contract, the actio quanti minoris.98 For example in Germany, if goods 
are defective, a buyer has the right to terminate the contract, demand compensation, or demand 
“reimbursement for wasted expenditures.”99 
Some civil law countries have sale of goods acts similar to common law countries’ acts 
and codes governing the sale of goods, like the English Sale of Goods Act of 1979.100 These acts 
prescribe remedies in the event a breach of a contract for the sale of goods occurs.  Moreover, 
they divide remedies for a breach of contract into buyers’ remedies in the event of a breach by a 
seller and sellers’ remedies in the event of a breach by a buyer.  For example, in the event of a 
breach by a seller under both Finland’s and Norway’s Sale of Goods Acts, a buyer is entitled to a 
reduction in price (if a seller delivers defective goods), or specific performance or monetary 
damages (if a seller fails to deliver a buyer’s goods), or both.101 Likewise, in the event of a 
breach by a buyer, a seller is entitled to specific performance or monetary damages.  Damages 
may consist of direct loss or indirect loss (which includes lost profits).  Moreover, in the event a 
breach of a sales contract occurs and a buyer replaces goods unjustifiably not delivered or a 
seller resells unjustifiably rejected goods, damages are calculated as the difference between the 
contract price and the price of the substitute transaction.  If a breach of contract occurs but a 
buyer does not procure substitute goods or a seller does not resell rejected goods, damages are 
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calculated as the difference between the contract price and the current price of the goods at the 
time and place of cancellation where the goods were to be delivered.102 Also, a number of 
countries in Europe, such as Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,  
Sweden and Switzerland, have adopted the U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG).103 
Requirements and Limitations. In order to recover either damnum emergens or lucrum 
cessans, or both types of damages, the claimant usually must satisfy several requirements, 
including causation, fault and certainty.  In general, the claimant bears the burden of proof with 
respect to these issues.104 Some jurisdictions also require that the claimant notify the respondent 
of its failure to fulfill its contractual obligations.  In addition, many preclude recovery for 
damages that the claimant could have avoided.  Furthermore, the requirements for the recovery 
of lost profits in civil law countries vary from country to country and, as a general rule, damages 
are more difficult to obtain than in common law countries. 
 Causation/Foreseeability. Like common law countries, many civil law countries require 
some form of causation before liability attaches.  In general, under the French model, causation 
is employed under the concept of foreseeability.105 Under French law, a respondent is liable only 
for damages “which were foreseen or which could have been foreseen at the time of the 
contract,” except in cases of a willful breach.106 The foreseeability requirement, which applies to 
both the type of damages and to the amount of damages, has the effect of limiting damages, 
especially for lost profits.  In addition to the requirement that damages be foreseeable, French 
law also requires that damages be the direct result of the breach.107 
As noted, the foreseeability requirement does not apply in cases of a willful breach (dol)
or, in some jurisdictions, a breach resulting from gross negligence.108 In the case of a willful 
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breach (or one made with gross negligence), the respondent is typically liable for both damnum 
emergens and lucrum cessans, as long as they are an immediate and direct result of the breach.109 
By contrast, German law does not recognize the concept of foreseeability.110 
Nevertheless, German law still limits damages through the concept of adequate causation.  The 
test for whether adequate causation exists has been expressed as whether “the obligor’s default, 
as judged by ordinary human standards at the time of its occurrence, render, more likely, 
damages of the kind actually suffered.”111 Under Austrian law, adequate causation exists if “the 
damage was not totally unforeseeable in the normal course of events.”112 
Certainty. In general, damages must be certain in their existence, but not in their 
amount.113 Countries following this rule allow recovery for future damages as long as the 
damages are certain to occur in the future.114 The loss of chance also may constitute 
compensable damages if the circumstances show that the chance was certain.115 The requirement 
that a claimant prove damages to a reasonable degree of certainty is sometimes treated as part of 
substantive law and is found in the civil code of a country, as it is in Italy.116 In other countries, 
such as Germany and Switzerland, however, the requirement of certainty is treated as a 
procedural requirement.117 
Fault. An often commented on distinction between common law and civil law is that in 
civil law there is generally no liability for damages unless the respondent was “at fault” in 
breaching the agreement.118 This could be satisfied by a willful breach or a breach resulting 
from negligence.119 In some countries, such as Germany and Austria, the burden is on the 
breaching party to prove the lack of fault.120 By contrast, in France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy 
the law places the burden to prove fault on the claimant.121 Under Austrian law, lost profits are 
not recoverable for breach of contract unless the breach was caused intentionally or with gross 
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negligence,122 or the respondent is a merchant who caused the damage during the course of 
business.123 
Notice. In many civil law countries, liability for breach of contract does not attach to 
non-performing parties until they have been put in default.124 Once a non-performing party is 
placed in default, damages begin to run against it.125 Putting the respondent in default is 
accomplished by providing notice, mise en demeure, to the respondent that performance, 
damages, or rescission of the contract is being demanded.126 The purpose of mise en demeure is 
for the claimant to assert a demand for performance, because failure to do so results in an 
assumption that the claimant has acquiesced to the respondent’s delayed performance.127 The 
mise en demeure is not required in certain instances, typically where performance must be within 
a set time,128 or where agreed to by the parties.129 
In Germany, in order for a claim for damages to arise, the respondent must fail to perform 
and the claimant must not only make a demand for performance, but must also fix an additional 
time for performance.130 Once the respondent is put in default and has been given additional 
time to perform, it becomes liable for damages.  This concept of providing a party who has failed 
to perform with additional time is known as Nachfrist.131 
Avoidability. There is no uniform approach to the reduction of damages due to the failure 
of claimants to use reasonable efforts to mitigate their losses. The rules in civil law countries, 
however, often achieve the same result by refusing to award damages if a claimant’s losses were 
caused by the claimant’s reckless attitude, or by reducing damages in accordance with the extent 
of the claimant’s fault.132 Under Swiss law, a judge may reduce the amount of damages for 
reasons “which he [the injured party] is responsible for having caused or aggravated. . . .”133 In 
France, it is accepted that the claimant  “should not be allowed to increase damages for losses 
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which were avoidable.”134 In Dutch law, an innocent party is under an obligation to reduce the 
damage caused by the breach of contract.  For instance, if a claimant acted negligently in not 
reducing its damages, the court will reduce the claimant’s award of damages accordingly.135 
When a claimant undertakes efforts to avoid loss, the expenses incurred in doing so are usually 
recoverable as reasonable costs of mitigation.136 In contracts for the sale of goods, for instance, 
there may be a duty to mitigate loss by going into the market and obtaining substitute goods.137 
The ICC Tribunal’s decision in Final Award in Case No. 8423 of 1994 illustrates the 
application of the causation requirement in a transnational dispute and the awarding of lost 
profits.138 There, two Portuguese companies (the claimants) entered into an association 
agreement with a subsidiary of a French company, the purpose of which was the exploitation of 
certain plants through a jointly owned company (the “Joint Company”).  The agreement also 
contained a non-competition clause.  The claimants then claimed that the French parent company 
(the respondent) breached the non-competition agreement by submitting offers for the 
construction and exploitation of four separate projects in which the Joint Company was also 
interested.  The tribunal noted that, under applicable “Portuguese law (Art. 798 Civil Code), 
contractual liability presupposes a wrongful failure to perform an obligation, a damage and a 
causal relationship between the wrongful failure to perform and damage.”139 It ruled that, while 
the French parent company violated the non-competition clause, there was no causation between 
the Joint Company’s claimed damage and the French parent company’s wrongful participation in 
the first three projects.  The Joint Company did not submit bids to participate in those projects 
and failed to prove it had the ability to do so or would have done so.  Because it failed to submit 
bids in the first three projects, the tribunal held that the Joint Company’s alleged lost profits from 
those projects would have occurred even if the French parent company had not breached its 
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obligations.  However, with respect to the fourth project, the tribunal ruled that adequate 
causation existed because the Joint Company did submit an offer for that project, and while the 
Tribunal noted that it could not “affirm with certainty that [the Joint Company] would have 
obtained the contract if the defendant French parent company had not submitted an offer[,]” the 
French parent company’s action “was such as to diminish, according to the ordinary course of 
things and general business experience, the chance of success of the submission by the [Joint 
Company].”140 Turning to the quantification of damages, the tribunal noted that it was “difficult 
to assess [the Joint Company’s] loss of opportunity to the French parent company’s breach of 
contract,” in part, because the claimants “failed to submit sufficient evidence of [their lost] 
profit.”141 Nevertheless, the Tribunal awarded the claimants as damages what it estimated to be 
the claimant’s share of the loss of possible profit, which was set at 12% of the [Joint Company’s] 
benefit.142 
B. North America 
1. Canada 
The primary purpose of damages in Canada is to protect claimants’ performance interest.  
Damages in Canada are designed to place claimants in as good a position as they would have 
been in had a breach of contract never occurred.143 
Nominal damages are awarded for breach of contract in Canada if the claimant can prove 
a respondent breached a contract, but did not suffer any pecuniary loss.144 The amount courts 
have awarded for nominal damages differs from decision to decision and has ranged anywhere 
from CAN$0.20 to CAN$250.145 
In addition, although punitive damages are normally not awarded in breach of contract 
disputes, Canadian courts have awarded them in certain instances, such as when the injury 
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caused is an independent actionable wrong sufficiently outrageous to warrant exemplary relief.146 
Although damages for non-pecuniary loss, such as physical harm, have always been awarded in 
Canada if the harm was foreseeable, damages for emotional harm have not typically been 
awarded.147 More recently, however, damages for emotional harm have been awarded.148 
Sale of Goods.  In Canada, contracts for the sale of goods are governed by provincial sale 
of goods acts.149 These acts are substantially similar to each other.150 
The provincial sale of goods acts in Canada typically provide that damages awarded in a 
breach of contract dispute should account for the loss “directly and naturally resulting” from the 
breach.151 These damages in sale of goods cases include losses incurred by a lost volume 
seller.152 The damages also include all losses incurred by a seller manufacturing specially 
manufactured items.153 
Where the buyer wrongfully refuses to accept a seller’s goods, the measure of damages is 
ascertained by calculating the difference between the contract price and the market price.154 
Likewise, where the seller wrongfully refuses to deliver contracted-for goods, the buyer may 
maintain an action against the seller for the difference between the contract price and the current 
market price of the goods.155 Damages are assessed at “the time or times when the goods ought 
to have been accepted, or, if no time is fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the refusal to 
accept.”156 
Limitations and Requirements.  Damages in Canada are restricted by certain limitations 
and requirements, amongst them the typical requirements of proof of foreseeability, certainty and 
avoidability.   
Causation/Foreseeability.  Courts in Canada follow the principle from Hadley v. 
Baxendale that damages, in order to be recoverable, must have been reasonably foreseeable or in 
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the contemplation of the breaching party at the time of the making of the contract.157 In some 
cases, Canadian courts have gone even further and required not just that unforeseeable 
consequences were in the contemplation of the respondent, but that an agreement was made 
between the parties that, in case of breach, the claimant would be compensated for the 
unforeseeable consequences.158 
Foreseeable loss can include damages that the respondent knew would probably occur but 
was not absolutely certain would occur after a breach of contract.  It can also include damages 
which occur that are of the same type of damage foreseen by the breaching party but not of the 
same magnitude.159 Canadian courts, however, are more hesitant to award damages in 
circumstances in which the respondent is not acting in its normal capacity, such as when an 
individual or company is either pressured into providing or agrees to provide goods in which it 
does not normally deal.160 
Certainty. In order for damages to be awarded, the claimant must prove  that the breach 
of contract resulted in loss to the claimant.161 However, as long as damages are proven to have 
occurred, the amount of damages does not necessarily need to be specifically proven in order for 
the claimant to be awarded damages.  Instead, a claimant has the burden of proving its damages 
“on a reasonable preponderance of credible evidence.”162 
In accordance with the seminal common law case of Chaplin v. Hicks, damages for loss 
of chance have also been awarded by Canadian courts, even in cases where the claimant’s chance 
was less than fifty percent.163 
Avoidability. A claimant may not recover loss that it could have avoided had it acted 
reasonably under the circumstances.164 Moreover, a claimant is not excused from mitigating its 
losses just because the expenditure of time or money is required in order to mitigate.165 
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However, a claimant is not required to take drastic measures to mitigate its losses.166 For 
example, a claimant is not required to ruin its reputation in order to mitigate its losses.167 
Moreover, a claimant is not forced to accept an offer from the respondent if, by accepting the 
offer, the claimant must give up some or all of its legal rights against the defendant.168 
The Ontario Court’s decision in Nova Tool & Mold Inc. v. London Industries Inc.169 
illustrates the application of the foreseeability and avoidability requirements and the calculation 
of damages in a transnational contract dispute.  In the case, Nova Tool, a Canadian company, and 
London Industries, an American company, entered into a contract in which Nova Tool agreed to 
construct molds for London Industries to use in manufacturing automobiles for Honda.  Nova 
Tool, however, fell extremely behind schedule in its construction of the molds and continually 
led London Industries to believe that, despite its delays, the molds would be constructed in 
accordance with the parties contracted-upon time line.  After almost a year of back and forth 
during which time the mold was not completed on schedule and numerous technical flaws in the 
molds were discovered, London Industries requested that the mold be moved to its facilities 
where it hired outside assistance to attempt to rectify the situation in order to fulfill its own 
contracts with Honda.  After Nova Tool sued London Industries for supposed non-payments on 
the molds, London Industries countersued for damages including lost profits, repair costs and 
cost of completion.  The Ontario Court ultimately held for London Industries, noting that the 
damages suffered by London Industries because of Nova Tool’s failure to prepare the mold on 
time and absent defects, were within the reasonable expectation of Nova Tool, even though the 
“quantum of [the] (buyer’s) damages . . . may be more than [the] seller anticipated.”170  
Additionally, the court held that even though the buyer was under a duty to mitigate its damages, 
the buyer in this case (London Industries) did not breach its duty to mitigate by failing to take its 
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business elsewhere after Nova Tool was repeatedly late in meeting deadlines, because its 
deadline with Honda was so close and the two parties had contracted for molds before during 
which Nova Tool had experienced problems during the manufacturing but had always supplied 
the molds on time and absent any defects.171 
2. United States 
In the United States, as in common law countries generally, damages are the primary 
remedy for breach of contract.172 Damages are fundamentally regarded as compensatory and are 
only to place innocent parties in the position they would have been in had the contract been 
performed.173 In the United States, a claimant has the option of selecting the method for 
assessing damages.  Thus, a claimant can decide against seeking damages that would protect its 
performance interest and instead seek damages that would protect its reliance or restitution 
interest.  In fact, jurisdictions in the United States have allowed a combination of damages to be 
pursued, as long as the award of the damages does not result in double recovery.174 
Damages are classified in three separate categories: nominal, general, and special. 
Nominal damages are a trivial sum of money awarded when the claimant has not, or cannot, 
prove that it suffered any compensable damage. General damages, like general damages in 
England, are damages that flow naturally from a breach of contract.  Special damages, 
synonymous with consequential damages, are damages that do not necessarily flow naturally 
from a breach of contract.175 
American contract law regards damages for breach of contract as primarily 
compensatory.  Accordingly, courts typically do not typically award punitive damages in 
contract cases.  However, punitive damages have been awarded when the breach of contract is 
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accompanied by fraudulent conduct or by an independent tort sufficiently outrageous to warrant 
such damages.176 
Damages for personal injuries are generally recoverable in a breach of contract action.  
Damages for mental suffering, however, are typically not recoverable.177 But there are 
exceptions to this general rule.  Emotional distress damages for breach of contract have been 
awarded in cases involving “peculiarly sensitive subject matter, or noncommercial undertakings, 
or both.”178 For example, they have been allowed in cases where harassing collection techniques 
were used, a burial contract was breached, and a contract for the transportation of a dead body 
was breached.179 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that recovery for mental 
suffering or emotional disturbance is allowed where the breach causes bodily harm or the nature 
of the contract is such that a breach of it is likely to result in serious emotional disturbance.180 
With respect to the calculation of damages, determining the sum of money varies, 
depending on the circumstances of the case, including whether the claimant terminated the 
contract and whether there was a complete or partial breach.181 The application of these 
principles can best be illustrated by looking at some common types of contracts.  These include 
contracts for the sale of goods. 
 Sale of Goods. In the United States, all states have adopted some form of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), a model law that governs a variety of commercial topics including the 
sale of goods under Article Two.182 All states except Louisiana have enacted Article Two of the 
UCC, some with minor (but insignificant) alterations.183 Both the 1951 and the revised version 
of Article Two of the UCC set forth different remedies for breach of a sales contract, including 
damages, depending on whether the claimant is a buyer or a seller and depending on the 
circumstances of the breach (e.g., non-delivery or repudiation).184 
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Section 2-706, 2-708, 2-709 and 2-710 set forth an aggrieved seller’s pecuniary remedies.  
Section 2-706 provides that an aggrieved seller may resell the goods concerned and recover 
damages.  It states: “Where the resale is made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable 
manner the seller may recover the difference between the resale price and the contract price 
together with any incidental damages allowed under the provisions of this Article (Section 2-
710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.”185 
Section 2-708 allows an aggrieved seller to recover damages for non-acceptance.  It 
states: 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with respect to 
proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-
acceptance or repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price 
at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any 
incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses 
saved in consequence of the buyer's breach. 
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the 
seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of 
damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have 
made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages 
provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably 
incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.186 
Section 2-709 provides that when a buyer fails to pay the price, the aggrieved seller may, 
in addition to any incidental damages, recover: 
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(a) the price of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged within a 
commercially reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer; and 
(b) the price of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after 
reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances 
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing.187 
Section 2-710 allows an aggrieved seller to recover incidental damages.  It states: 
“Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges, 
expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of 
goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise 
resulting from the breach.”188 
With respect to an aggrieved buyer’s pecuniary remedies, Section 2-711 provides that 
when a seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightly rejects or justifiably 
revokes acceptance, or when the breach goes to the whole contract, the buyer may cancel and (1) 
cover and claim damages, or (2) recover damages for non-delivery.189 With respect to damages 
for non-delivery, Section 2-713 states: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price 
(Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the 
seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer 
learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and 
consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses 
saved in consequence of the seller's breach. 
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of 
rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.190 
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Section 2-714 provides for the recovery of damages for breach in regard to accepted 
goods.  It states: 
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) of 
Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the 
loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as 
determined in any manner which is reasonable. 
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time 
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value 
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances 
show proximate damages of a different amount. 
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next 
section may also be recovered.191 
Section  2-715 sets forth an aggrieved buyer's incidental and consequential damages.  It 
provides: 
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses 
reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of 
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or 
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense 
incident to the delay or other breach. 
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include 
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which 
the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not 
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and 
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(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of 
warranty.192 
Revised Version of U.C.C. Article Two.  In 2003, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Law and the American Law Institute promulgated a revised 
version of Article Two.  To date, no states have adopted the revised version.  The changes to 
Article Two, especially to the remedies section of Article Two, are relatively minor.  
 With respect to a seller’s remedies in the event a buyer breaches a contract for the sale of 
goods, Section 2-708 of the revised version of Article Two provides that, in addition to 
collecting incidental damages in a damage award, a seller may also recover consequential 
damages.193 Section 2-708 was also revised and now provides that a seller may recover damages 
under Section 2-708(2) not only if collecting damages under Section 2-708(1) is inadequate to 
put the seller in the position it would have been in had the contract been performed, but also if 
collecting damages under Section 2-706 is inadequate to put the seller in the position the seller 
would have been in had the contract been performed.  In short, if a seller is a lost-volume seller 
who therefore is inadequately compensated under Section 2-708(1) or Section 2-706, the seller 
may recover the full amount for the goods in question (not just the difference between the market 
price and the contract price or the cover price and the contract price) under Section 2-708(2).  
 With respect to a buyer’s remedies in the event a seller breaches a contract for the sale of 
goods, Section 2-712 of the revised version of Article Two clarifies the circumstances in which a 
buyer is entitled to cover.194 Moreover, Section 2-713 clarifies the time at which the market 
price in a cover situation is to be measured.  According to Section 2-713(1)(a), the market price 
in cases other than anticipatory repudiation is measured at the time for tender.  Section 2-
713(1)(b), on the other hand, provides that the market price in the case of anticipatory 
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repudiation is measured at the “expiration of a commercially reasonable time after the buyer 
learned of the repudiation.”195 
Limitations and Requirements. The recovery of damages in the United States is subject 
to requirements and limitations similar to those found in common law England.  These include: 
causation, foreseeability, certainty, and avoidability. 
 Causation/Foreseeability. In order for a claimant to recover damages from a respondent, 
it must prove that the respondent’s non-performance was the cause of the losses it suffered, or 
the gains it was prevented from acquiring.  This question often boils down to whether, within the 
realm of common sense and experience, the respondent’s breach can be viewed as the cause of 
the claimant’s loss.196 This concept is generally discussed in conjunction with the ideas of 
remoteness and foreseeability.  One commentator notes that “our only test of ‘causation’. . . is 
foreseeability.”197 
In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has slightly narrowed the 
principles set forth in Hadley v. Baxendale.198 The Restatement provides: “Damages are not 
recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of 
the breach when the contract was made.”199 A loss may be foreseeable if  “it arises in the 
ordinary course of events, or . . . as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course 
of events, that the party in breach had reason to know.”200 The ability of the breaching party to 
foresee damages is evaluated at the time the contract was made.201 
Article Two of the UCC provides a similar formulation to the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts.202 It states inter alia that a “buyer may recover as damages for any non-conformity of 
tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller’s breach as determined in 
any reasonable manner.”203 It also provides that “[c]onsequential damages resulting from the 
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seller’s breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of 
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be 
prevented by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from 
any breach of warranty.”204 
Certainty. Claimants cannot merely assert they have suffered a loss; they must prove it to 
a reasonable degree of certainty.205 This rule applies only to the existence of loss, not the extent 
of loss.206 Difficulty in assessing damages will not bar recovery.207 Furthermore, the certainty 
requirement does not, as a general rule, automatically bar the awarding of damages for loss of 
profits.208 In fact, in the United States, courts have been willing to award lost profits even in 
cases where the claimant is a new business.209 In addition, in the United States, while courts 
typically follow a no-fault rule with respect to damages, they have been “less demanding in 
applying the requirement [of certainty] if the breach was ‘wilful.’”210 American courts have also 
held that claims for the loss of “good will” need only be proved with “sufficient certainty.”211 
Avoidability. Once a claimant has been injured by a breach of contract, it must not 
unreasonably continue performance, and must desist and claim damages in which allowance will 
be made for expenses saved by not completing performance.212 This is different from the 
English rule, which does not require claimants to mitigate loss by accepting the respondent’s 
repudiation and suing for damages.213 The burden is placed on the respondent to show the 
claimant has failed in this respect.214 In mitigating, a claimant is not required to do anything that 
might injure the claimant’s commercial reputation.215 
The arbitral tribunal’s decision in Final Award in Case No. 8362 of 1995 illustrates the 
application of the certainty and foreseeability requirements and the calculation of damages in a 
transnational contract dispute.216 There, a United Kingdom distributor (the claimant) sought 
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from an American manufacturer (the respondent), who breached an exclusive distributorship 
agreement, expectation damages equal to lost net profits (i.e, estimated gross profits that it would 
have received over the duration of the distribution agreement but for the respondent’s breach less 
variable costs).  To determine the amount of damages, the tribunal looked to the applicable law, 
New York law, which provided that the claimant must show “(i) that it has suffered harm; (ii) 
that such harm was caused with certainty by the breach, and (iii) that the amount of its damages 
is established with reasonable certainty.”217 With respect to the first two requirements, the 
tribunal determined that the claimant established with certainty that, as a direct result of the 
breach, the claimant lost its rights: (i) to purchase respondent’s product at a discount, and (ii) to 
the exclusive distribution of the respondent’s product in the United Kingdom and continental 
Europe.  This resulted in a decline in the claimant’s sales in those regions.  Furthermore, the 
tribunal  found that “the right to resell at a profit was what was contemplated by the parties upon 
concluding the Distribution Agreement, so that the loss of profit suffered from the withdrawal of 
that right was clearly in the contemplation of the parties.”218 As a result, the claimant’s loss was 
an immediate and direct cause of the respondent’s breach.  Turning to the calculation of 
damages, the tribunal noted that, under New York law, a consistently applied specific rule for 
calculating net profits did not exist.  However, that did not preclude the award of damages.  The 
tribunal explained that damages need not be calculated with precision.  Instead, there only needs 
to be a sound basis for determining their amount.  The tribunal calculated the lost net profit owed 
to the claimant as a percentage of the estimated lost sales equal to gross margin less avoided 
costs.219 
C. Latin America 
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Damages throughout Latin America reflect the civil law distinction between damnum 
emergens and lucrum cessans, both of which are recoverable upon a breach of contract.220 For 
example, the Civil Code of Brazil provides that if the respondent breaches the contract, the 
respondent will be liable for the actual loss suffered by the claimant in addition to what the 
claimant reasonably failed to gain.221 The amount that the claimant reasonably failed to gain is 
determined by the difference between the value of the claimant’s assets had the breach not 
occurred and the value of the claimant’s assets after the breach.222 This calculation includes lost 
profits.223 Therefore, damages are intended to award claimants their performance interest by 
placing claimants in the position they expected to be in had the contract been performed. 
 Damages in Argentina, meanwhile, are often categorized as either “positive” or 
“negative” damage.224 Negative damage is defined as the loss a party failed to gain.  Positive 
damage, on the other hand, is defined as the actual loss a party incurred.  In addition to these 
losses, damages in Argentina may include non-compensatory recovery, such as recovery for 
moral damages including the loss of business reputation.225 Recovery for these non-pecuniary 
losses is conditioned on a finding that the breach was wanton, outrageous or with malice.226 
Moral damages are also recoverable in breach of contract actions in Paraguay.227 
Causation/Foreseeability. Losses are only compensable if they are directly caused by the 
respondent’s non-performance.228 This requirement of causation is the standard throughout civil 
law countries.  For example, in Argentina, damages are restricted to those which are the 
immediate and direct result of the breach.229 One commentator notes that directness has been 
interpreted consistently with the concept of foreseeability in some cases,230 which would make 
Argentinean law consistent with the civil law tradition.  Where the breach is the result of dolo 
(fraud), the respondent is liable for indirect consequences as well.231 In general, however, a 
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respondent in Latin America is only liable for direct damage that is foreseeable as a result of the 
breach of contract.232 
Certainty. Generally, damages must be certain in their existence, but not in amount.233 
According to the Guatemalan Civil Code, the victim of a breach of contract is only required to 
prove that it suffered damages.234 Although damages for non-pecuniary loss are difficult to 
prove with certainty, damages for sentimental feelings may be awarded in Mexico, but only if 
the claimant can prove the respondent breached its contract with the purpose of inflicting 
sentimental damage.235 
Fault. Similar to some European civil codes, some Latin American countries require that 
in order to establish liability against the respondent for breach of contract, the claimant must 
prove the respondent was at fault in breaching the contract.  The 2002 civil code of Brazil 
significantly narrows this principle, allowing excused non-performance only in the case of force 
majeure.236 In other Latin American countries, fault must be established but the respondent may 
avoid liability if it proves its non-performance was due to some event not attributable to its own 
actions.237 Meanwhile, in Argentina, in contracts where a specific result is contracted for, the 
respondent is presumed to have been at fault in the event of non-performance, in contrast to 
contracts for “certain means,” in which fault must be proven.238 In addition, respondents under 
Paraguayan law will only be held liable for a breach of contract if their non-performance 
occurred as a result of their own negligence.239 
Notice.  In civil law, a breach of contract does not always automatically entitle the 
claimant to damages.  Consequently, the claimant in most Latin American countries, unless the 
contract calls for the performance to take place on a given date,  typically has the formal duty of 
putting the breaching party in default by notifying the breaching party of its intent to sue.240 
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D. Middle East 
Contract law in the Middle East is reflective of various influences, including civil law 
and Islamic law (Shari’a).241 For example, Egypt’s Civil Code of 1949 was originally based on 
the French Civil Code.242 Turkey’s civil code has been heavily influenced by the Swiss Code of 
Obligations.243 Before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran was influenced by the French and 
German civil codes.  Today, as a result of the Revolution, its legal system is a mix of civil and 
Islamic law, however all laws in Iran are required to follow Islamic law.244 Israel, meanwhile, 
has adopted a mixed system, which blends civil law, common law and, in areas reserved to 
religious jurisdiction, Jewish law.245 Notwithstanding the various sources of law, the goal of 
awarding damages for breach of contract in most Middle Eastern countries is to place the injured 
party in the position that it would have been in had the contract been performed.  How that goal 
is achieved, however, varies greatly among the countries in the region.246 
In many Middle Eastern countries, the primary remedy is specific performance. However, 
when specific performance is impossible or too burdensome, monetary damages are awarded in 
order to compensate the injured party.247 In Kuwait and Egypt, for example, a distinction is 
made between damnum emergens and lucrum cessans. Both are recoverable.248 Meanwhile, in 
Jordan and the U.A.E., the recovery of lost profits is not allowed.  Instead, damages are based on 
“the damages actually sustained at the time [the breach] occurred.”249 This reflects the dictates 
of the Shari’a which views lost profits, moral prejudice, and delay in performance as intangible 
elements that are not compensable.250 
Kuwaiti law is more generous toward injured parties in cases of breach of contract.  For 
example, where defective goods have been delivered in contracts for the sale of goods, Kuwaiti 
law allows the buyer to rescind the sale, return the goods, and recover both the purchase price in 
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addition to damages, such as loss of profits.251 In contrast, in Jordan and the U.A.E., the buyer is 
only allowed to recover the actual purchase price of the goods, unless a separate tort was 
committed along with a breach of contract.252 
In Iran, damages are limited to losses which the injured party actually suffered.  Damages 
for loss of profits are typically not awarded.  However, aggrieved parties may recover the cost of 
obtaining substitute performance.253 
Meanwhile, in Israel, an injured party to a contract has three basic remedies: (1) 
enforcement of the contract; (2) rescission of the contract; and (3) recovery of damages, which 
may be recovered in addition to or independent of the first two remedies.  As is the case in many 
civil law countries, specific performance, not damages, is the primary remedy in Israeli law.254 
The primary purpose of damages in Israel is to put claimants in the position they 
expected to be in once the contract was performed, giving them the “benefit of the bargain.”255 
Thus, damages are compensatory.  The Israeli Remedies law states that a claimant “is entitled to 
compensation for the damage caused to him . . . which the person in breach foresaw, or should 
have foreseen, at the time the contract was made.”256 Damages include lost profits.257 
Furthermore, like many common law countries, damages are distinguished between a claimant’s 
performance interest and reliance interest, and claimants choose which measure of recovery to 
seek.258 Claimants may also seek a combination of remedies, such as restitution combined with 
lost profits.259 Finally, in a break from traditional English common law, non-pecuniary losses 
may be recovered under Israeli contract law.260 
Requirements and Limitations. Recovery of damages in Middle Eastern countries is 
limited by the same constraints as those found in European civil codes.  First, damages must 
have been caused by the breach and must have been foreseeable.  Moreover, in some countries, 
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there must also be fault on the part of the non-performing party and notice must be provided in 
order to put breaching parties in default of their obligations.  Avoidability is also a limitation. 
 Causation/Foreseeability. In order to award damages for a claimant’s actual loss or loss 
of profits under Kuwaiti law, the claimant must prove that its damages were the natural 
consequences of the breach.261 Therefore, the respondent is typically only liable for the losses 
incurred by the claimant which were foreseeable or should have been foreseeable by the 
respondent at the time the contract was entered into.262 However, if the respondent is found 
guilty of “fraud or gross negligence,” a claimant may recover damages that were the direct 
consequence of the breach but may not have been foreseeable by the respondent at the time the 
contract was entered into. 263 
An illustration that damages must be both foreseeable and the direct result of the 
respondent’s breach in order to be compensable, is case no.1/1984, decided by an arbitration 
panel under Egyptian law.264 The claimant, a European company, entered into a contract with 
the respondent, the Minister of Agriculture for an African state, to dust crop fields using 
airplanes.  As part of the parties’ agreement, the respondent agreed to maintain the safety of the 
runway for the claimant’s flight operations.  The respondent, however, failed to uphold its 
contracted-for obligation and allowed a vehicle to enter the runway just as the claimant’s plane 
was taxiing down the runway.  The claimant’s plane crashed and the claimant subsequently 
sought compensation from the respondent, for damages it suffered including the loss of profit 
from a contract with another African state for crop dusting, where the same plane was being 
used.  In deciding this issue, the Tribunal looked to Article 221 of the Egyptian Civil Code, the 
civil code governing the dispute.  That provision provides: 
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The judge will fix the amount of damages, if it has not been fixed in the contract 
or by the law. The amount of damages includes losses suffered by the creditor and 
profits of which he has been deprived, provided that the damages are the normal 
result of the failure to perform the obligation or of delay in performance.  These 
losses shall be considered to be the normal result if the creditor is not able to 
avoid them by making a reasonable effort.  
When, however, the obligation arises from contract, a debtor who has not been 
guilty of fraud or gross negligence will not be held liable for damages greater than 
those which could have normally been foreseen at the time of entering into the 
contract.265 
Applying this article, the Tribunal held that the loss resulting from the separate contract was “an 
indirect prejudice for which the Respondent could not be held responsible.”266 
In Israel, it is essential that a claimant, in order to ensure recovery, proves its loss was 
actually caused by the non-performing party’s breach of contract.  In addition, the loss must have 
been foreseeable, or should have been foreseeable, to the breaching party at the time the contract 
was made.267 
Fault. In many Middle Eastern countries, the failure to perform must be attributable to 
the fault of the respondent and the fault must be the material cause of the injury.268 For example, 
in Iran, the basic civil law principle of fault is explicitly required to exist in order for a claimant 
to recover damages from a respondent.269 However, in Egypt, the non-performance of the 
obligation is, in itself, sufficient to show fault, except in the case of force majeure or fault of the 
claimant.270 In Israel, meanwhile, proof of fault is not required.  Therefore, the extent of 
damages awarded is not altered depending on the conduct of the breaching party.  If a respondent 
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acts in “bad faith” damages are not extended, as they are, for example, in Kuwait, to encompass 
unforeseeable losses.271 
Notice. In order for injured parties to recover damages or rescind a contract, the non-
performing party must be put on notice in Egypt.272 In Iran, if no time is called for performance, 
parties must prove they demanded performance before they can be awarded damages.  The party 
must have authorization in order to set a period for performance.273 There is no requirement of 
notice in Israel. 
 Certainty. According to one scholar, an important aspect of the Shari’a is that damages 
may only be awarded for losses to which an exact value can be assigned.274 Since the value of 
loss of profit, moral damages, and delay in performance cannot be quantified in exact numbers, 
Shari’a dictates that damages for these losses may not be awarded.  Some Middle Eastern 
countries, however, do not follow this teaching.  For example, according to Kuwait’s Civil Code, 
damages for “moral prejudice” may be granted to the victim of a breach of contract.275 
In Israel, pecuniary damages, including damages for lost profits, must be proven to a 
reasonable degree of certainty.276 Recovery for non-pecuniary damages is available; however, 
non-pecuniary damages, by their very nature are almost impossible to prove with certainty.  
Consequently, in awarding non-pecuniary damages, a court may use its discretion.277 
Avoidability. In many Middle Eastern countries, there is no express duty on the part of 
the claimant to take reasonable actions to mitigate its losses. However, Middle Eastern codes do 
provide that courts may take into consideration whether the claimant increased its losses after the 
breach of contract or had any part in causing the breaching party’s non-performance in the first 
place.278 This principle is illustrated by the decision of the Tribunal in case no. 12/1989, decided 
under Egyptian law.279 
41
In that case, the claimant, an international company, was seeking damages, including lost 
profits, from the respondent, an African agricultural bank after the bank cancelled the parties’ 
contract for the sale of grain.  After the parties entered into a contract for the sale of grain, the 
respondent backed out of the agreement and the claimant was left with the rejected grain.  Even 
though the price of grain had increased on the date the respondent backed out of the agreement, 
the claimant failed to attempt to resell the goods.  Consequently, the Tribunal held that “the 
claimant had contributed to its own loss by failing to dispose of the cargo at a higher price and 
mitigating its own loss,” and refused to award the claimant damages for lost profits, but did 
award it damages for administrative and other expenses incurred in the transaction.280 
The Israeli Remedies law also includes a codification of the common law requirement 
that claimants mitigate their losses.  Section 14(a) states that breaching parties “shall not be 
liable . . . for damages which the injured party could have prevented or reduced by reasonable 
measures.”281 
E. Asia 
In Asia, some countries follow a common law tradition, others a civil law tradition, and a 
few, like the Philippines, have mixed systems. 
 
1. Common Law Based Systems 
India follows the common law tradition in which damages are the primary remedy for 
breach of contract.282 The goal of awarding damages for breach of contract is to compensate the 
claimant for loss and this entails putting the claimant in the position it would have been in had 
the contract been fulfilled.283 
Damages are broken down into three categories: nominal, general and special 
damages.284 Nominal damages may be awarded where the actual amount of damages cannot be 
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judged or where the claimant has not been able to prove any actual loss.285 General damages are 
those which may not be proved beyond what a reasonable person can judge.  Special damages on 
the other hand are precisely quantifiable.  The only real difference between general and special 
damages is that special damages must be specially pleaded to be recoverable. 
Damages are generally not awaded for mental anguish or for loss of reputation, however 
they may be recoverable when a contract’s purpose is to provide peace of mind.286 
Sale of Goods. In a contract for the sale of goods, damages typically are measured by the 
difference between the contract price and the market price at the time of the breach.287 Market 
price is to be determined at the place for delivery of the goods.288 
Requirements and Limitations. A respondent’s liability for losses to the claimant is 
limited in India by the typical requirements that the damage be caused by the respondent’s 
breach and that the damage was foreseeable.  The claimant must prove, with reasonable 
certainty, the amount of damages it suffered.  Finally, damages for loss that the claimant could 
have avoided through reasonable means are not recoverable. 
 Causation/Foreseeability. The measure of damages in India follows the rule from 
Hadley v. Baxendale.  Damages are broken into two categories: 1) those which follow naturally 
from the consequences of the breach in question; and 2) those for which it must be shown the 
parties contemplated liability in the case of a breach.289 Mere notice to the respondent of special 
circumstances will not suffice to make the respondent liable for those circumstances in the case 
of a breach.  The respondent must accept liability for special circumstances in the event it 
breaches the contract.290 
The application of the requirement that a respondent accept liability for special 
circumstances is illustrated in Dominion of India v. All India Reporter Ltd.291 In that case, the 
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claimant lost three volumes of a parcel of books making the entire set useless.  The court found 
that the railway was not liable for the loss of the entire set, as they had no notice the loss of the 
three volumes would make the entire set useless.292 
Certainty. In holding with the principle that damages are to be compensatory only, the 
claimant must not only prove that it suffered a loss, but it must also prove the extent of the loss it  
suffered.  Damages need not be proven with absolute certainty.  Instead, the level of certainty 
must be reasonable from the viewpoint of a prudent and impartial person.293 
Avoidability. A claimant must not only show adequate causation and proof of loss, it 
must show that it could not have mitigated its loss by reasonable efforts.294 The claimant, 
however, has no obligation to “destroy his own property, or to injure himself or his commercial 
reputation, to reduce the damages payable by the defendant.”295 
Final Award in Case No. 8445 of 1996 illustrates the awarding of damages in Indian 
law.296 In that case, the tribunal ruled that the respondent, a German manufacturer, breached a 
technology licensing agreement that it entered into with the claimant, an Indian manufacturer, by 
failing to provide the claimant with documents required under the contract.  The tribunal applied 
the Indian Contract Act of 1872 which “provides that in order to recover for breach of contract, 
the aggrieved party must show that such damage arose naturally in the usual course of things 
from such breach, or was damage which the parties knew when they made the contract would be 
the likely result.”297 In the case, the court found that the loss of profit was the natural result of 
the respondent’s breach.  The tribunal explained that “[t]he claimant unquestionably expected to 
make a profit from the local manufacture and the sale of products [resulting from the licensing 
agreement], and its inability to do so naturally led to a loss of profits, a result which both parties 
must have known at the time they entered into the agreement.”298 
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The tribunal also found that the claimant need not prove the amount of damages with 
absolute certainty, and noted “[all that] is required . . . is a reasonable estimate of loss based on 
such elements as are available.”299 The claimant met this test by providing detailed and reasoned 
estimates of the costs of production, the prices at which the products could be sold, their 
prospective market share and projected sales growth, and the ensuing profit that would have been 
made.  As a result, the tribunal awarded the claimant lost profits for the duration of the 
agreement.300 However, the claimant’s request for damages due to loss or reputation was 
rejected on the grounds that proof of such loss, and especially the quantum of any such loss, is 
too speculative to serve as a basis for an award.301 
2. Civil Law Systems 
China, Japan and South Korea follow the civil law tradition.  In Japan and South Korea, a 
claimant’s first remedy upon the other party’s breach of contract is specific performance of the 
obligation.302 When specific performance is not possible or performance would be valueless, 
damages are the normal remedy.303 In China, claimants also have the option to request specific 
performance.  However, damages are awarded when performance is impossible, specific 
performance is impractical or excessive, or when the claimant requests that performance occur in 
an unreasonable time frame.304 
Japan and South Korea classify damages into two categories: positive interest and the 
negative interest.305 The purpose of damages is to put the injured party in the position it would 
have been in had the contract been performed.  Following a breach of a sales contract by delay in 
performance, the claimant can recover the difference between the contract price and the market 
price at the time of delivery.306 Profits that were lost because of the delay may also be recovered. 
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Damages are also divided into two other categories: ordinary and special damages.307 
Ordinary damages are those which are likely to arise in the “normal course of events,” while 
special damages are those “resulting from special circumstance.”308 This division exists from the 
importation of the principles of Hadley v. Baxendale into Japan and South Korea.309 
China, on the other hand, recently made a large step towards a comprehensive law of 
contracts with the enactment of the Uniform Contract Law of China (UCL).310 Roughly modeled 
on both the Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
contract, damages under the new law are designed to compensate a claimant for the loss which 
the respondent’s breach of contract caused.311 This places the claimant in the position in which it 
expected to be once the contract was performed.312 The UCL, unlike the Uniform Commercial 
Code in the United States, does not provide specific provisions on the calculation of damages.313 
In Japan, where the only obligation of the respondent consists of the payment of money, 
damages are specifically limited to the amount of interest owed on the money.  The claimant 
does not have to prove damages.314 In addition, fault need not be proven when the only 
obligation is the payment of money.315 This situation may arise where a buyer refused to pay for 
goods received, and it is generally accepted that sellers may not recover damages beyond the 
delayed interest, even if proven.316 
Sale of Goods. There is no separate law in Japan governing contracts for the sale of 
goods.  Damages typically equal the difference between the contract and market price, or where 
a resale has occurred, the difference between the contract price and resale price.  In general, the 
buyer’s expected profits fall into the category of special damages.317 
In sale of goods cases in China, where a buyer has breached a contract, Article 109 of the 
UCL provides that the seller may demand the price.  However, there does not appear to be a 
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requirement that the seller be unable to resell the goods.318 This would probably not create a 
problem of windfall to the seller because the duty to mitigate losses makes it nearly impossible 
for the seller to be able to sit on the goods and collect the goods’ price from the recalcitrant 
buyer.  If the goods fail to meet the quality required under the contract, the buyer has the right to 
either demand that the seller bear the cost of curing the defect, or demand that the seller replace 
the goods.  The buyer may also return the goods, and the buyer can ask for a reduction in 
price.319 
Limitations and Requirements. In order for a claimant to collect damages after a breach 
of contract, the claimant must be able to prove that the loss was caused by the respondent’s non-
performance.320 Some countries also require that the claimant prove that the respondent’s non-
performance is attributable to the fault of the respondent and that, to a reasonable degree of 
certainty, the claimant’s loss was not due to its own fault.321 A claimant must also mitigate its 
losses, and bear the cost if it fails to take reasonable efforts to prevent the aggravation of its 
losses.322 
Causation/Foreseeability. As to the scope of damages available, contract law in Japan 
and Korea were influenced by Germanic legal theory and consequently the extent of liability for 
breach of contract in these two countries is determined according to the concept of adequate 
causation.323 The civil codes of both Korea and Japan restrict damages to those which would 
ordinarily arise from the non-performance of the obligation.324 The respondent is responsible for 
“damages that have arisen through special circumstances, only if he had foreseen or could have 
foreseen such circumstances.”325 
This distinction between ordinary and extraordinary loss is not always easy to make and 
depends largely on the facts of each case.326 Normal loss has included such things as the cost of 
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finding alternative goods.327 It has also included the profit which a buyer intends to make on the 
resale of goods.328 In one case, however, the court found that a contract to resell goods at triple 
the purchase price was a special circumstance that could not have been foreseen by the seller.329 
In China, a country which modeled the recently promulgated UCL on the Convention on 
the International Sales of Goods, in order for a claimant to collect damages from a respondent, 
the damages must have been foreseeable at the time the parties entered into the contract.330 
Fault. Fault is also an important consideration in a breaching party’s liability for 
damages in Korea and Japan.  If, for example, an owner of a boat sells the boat and the boat is 
subsequently destroyed, the owner is not responsible for compensating the buyer if the owner of 
the boat was not at fault in the destruction.331 This principle, however, does not apply to a seller 
who was already in breach by delay when the subject matter of the sale was destroyed.  Fault on 
the part of the respondent is also required in order for the respondent to be liable for damages for 
delay of performance or positive breach of contract.332 Fault, however, is not required when the 
only obligation is the payment of money.333 
Avoidability. In Korea and Japan, “[i]f there has been any fault on the part of the obligee 
. . . the Court shall take it into account in determining the liability of the respondent and 
assessing the amount of damages.”334 The language of these provisions refers to the 
respondent’s fault in the non-performance of the obligation, but it also refers to the claimant’s 
fault in contributing to its losses.335 The requirement of fault puts a less rigorous burden on the 
claimant than the requirement in common law jurisdictions that the party use reasonable efforts 
to mitigate its loss. 
 In China, Article 114 of the UCL enunciates the rule of mitigation.  It states that the party 
suffering any loss must take prompt measures to prevent further losses.  If the party suffering the 
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loss does not take measures to prevent further losses, that party does not have the right to claim 
compensation for any additional loss.336 
F. Oceania 
New Zealand and Australia both follow the common law tradition and thus the rules 
regarding damages for breach of contract in New Zealand and Australia are similar to the Anglo-
American and English common law rules regarding damages for breach of contract.337 
In Australia and New Zealand, damages are the primary and often the only remedy of an 
injured party to a contract.338 The point of damages for breach of contract in New Zealand and 
Australia is to put the claimant in the position it expected to be in had the contract been 
performed.339 Damages are often considered to fall into one of three types of interest following a 
breach of contract: restitution, reliance and performance interest.340 A combination of damages 
can be pursued, as long as double recovery does not result.341 
Like in England, a court in Australia and New Zealand can award general, special or 
nominal damages.342 Nominal damages are awarded when the claimant cannot show any loss 
but it is clear the other party committed a breach of contract.343 
Compensation for emotional harm and distress is generally considered inappropriate in 
breach of contract cases, particularly in commercial cases.344 However, if damages for mental 
distress were within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into, 
they may be recoverable.345 
Putting the claimant in the position it expected to be in after the contract was performed 
requires compensation for two types of damages in Australian law:  loss for the benefit promised 
under the contract; and consequential loss.  To determine the first, the court must place a value 
on the performance which the claimant was wrongfully denied.  This is not always easy and 
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different approaches are used in the various contractual settings.  For instance, in a construction 
contract, a contractor who unjustifiably leaves a job is liable for the cost to complete the work.  
Consequential loss includes losses which would not have been suffered had the contract been 
performed, such as lost profits, expenses in performing obligations under the contract, and 
wasted expenditures.  These losses often are the type of losses which are not compensable under 
the limitation on remote damage.346 
Sale of Goods. Contracts for the sale of goods in New Zealand and Australia are 
governed by each country’s Sale of Goods Act.347 The remedies of the buyer and seller are 
separate, but the effect of the available remedies is to award the non-breaching party its 
performance interest.348 
The seller has the right to damages only where the goods have not been accepted, or have 
been accepted late.  However, a buyer has a right to damages upon non-delivery (including late 
delivery) and breach of warranty.349 
In the case of a seller’s failure to deliver goods, damages are assessed as the difference 
between the contract price and the market price.350 If goods are delivered late, damages are 
assessed as the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time the goods 
were to be delivered.351 
In Australia, the buyer may recover damages for breach of warranty, and failure to 
deliver.352 The buyer may also claim restitution for any money paid when the consideration for 
the payment failed, such as non-delivery.353 
Requirements and Limitations. Australia and New Zealand both share the same 
limitations and requirements found in England and the United States with respect to the recovery 
of damages.  The loss to the claimant must be caused by the respondent’s non-performance, the 
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loss must not be too remote, the claimant must be able to show the loss to a reasonable degree of 
certainty, and the claimant must have taken reasonable efforts to minimize its loss.  
 Causation/Foreseeability. A causal connection must exist between the respondent’s 
breach and the claimant’s loss.354 It is irrelevant that the claimant may have contributed to its 
own loss, unless the claimant’s contribution is so great that it breaks the causal chain between the 
respondent and the loss.355 
Both Australia and New Zealand restrict the recovery of damages according to the 
foreseeability principle enunciated in Hadley v. Baxendale. In New Zealand, however, Hadley is 
only a starting point for the consideration of whether the claimant’s loss is too remote to be 
compensable.  In the case of McElroy Milne v. Commercial Electonics Ltd.,356 the court found 
that “reasonable foresight or contemplation, . . . are always . . . important consideration[s].  I 
doubt whether they are the only consideration[s].”357 The court went on to hold that other factors 
including the respondent’s culpability should be taken into consideration.358 
The two types of losses created by Hadley are still applicable to questions of recoverable 
damage.359 In a case where delay in payment for scoured wool resulted in further loss in 
conversion to New Zealand dollars, the loss was found not to be too remote.360 In general, if the 
type of loss that was sustained was foreseeable, the respondent is liable regardless of the extent 
of the loss.361 The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is followed in Australia, however, it is only the 
kind of loss that must be foreseeable, not the extent of the loss.362 
Certainty. Damages must also be proven to a reasonable degree of certainty.  The 
certainty rule applies only to the fact of damages, not to the amount of damages.363 In a recent 
decision, the New Zealand court of appeal awarded damages for lost profits from increased 
competition even though the claimant could not produce precise figures as to the amount of 
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business it lost as a result of the breach.364 The court found that it was clear the claimant had 
suffered a loss and awarded the amount which the court “was satisfied that the loss could not 
have been less than.”365 Thus, if the claimant provides sufficient evidence of loss or damage,366 
the fact that the amount of damages are difficult to assess generally is no bar to recovery.367 
Avoidability. In New Zealand and Australia a claimant must mitigate its losses upon a 
breach of contract.368 In other words, the failure to mitigate results in damages being calculated 
as if the claimant did not act reasonably to minimize its loss.369 If the claimant, in an attempt to 
mitigate its losses, increases its losses, the respondent may still be liable if the claimant’s attempt 
is deemed reasonable.370 
Australia, however, follows the same rule as England, that a claimant “need not mitigate 
loss, even after the [respondent’s] performance of the contract which he has repudiated falls due, 
by accepting the repudiation and suing for damages.”371 
IV. DAMAGES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS   
CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) applies “to 
contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different countries: (a) 
when the States are Contracting States; or (b) when the rules of private international law lead to 
the application of the law of a Contracting State.”372 Under the CISG, if a party fails to perform 
its contractual obligations, the injured party, depending on whether the injured party is a buyer or 
seller, has various remedies, including damages.373 Specific performance is also more readily 
available to a buyer or seller than is available under common law.374 
Damages under the provisions of the CISG seek to give the injured party its performance 
interest.375 CISG Article 74 provides that a claimant may recover, for breach of contract, “a sum 
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equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered . . . as a consequence of the breach.”376 The 
goal of  this provision is to place the claimant in the same economic position it would have been 
in had the breach not occurred.  In other words, it is designed to protect a claimant’s performance 
interest by giving it the benefit of the bargain. 
 Article 74 provides the basic principle for the recovery of damages under the CISG, 
although it does not provide specific guidelines for the calculation of damages.377 In particular, 
it does not contain a separate provision for the calculation of damages for breach of warranty.  
Instead, Article 74 grants a tribunal the authority to determine the claimant’s “loss . . . suffered . . 
. as a consequence of the breach” based on the circumstances of the particular case.378 It also 
explicitly provides that damages for breach of contract include lost profits.  The Secretariat 
Commentary explains that the specific reference to loss of profit was included “because in some 
legal systems the concept of ‘loss’ standing alone does not include loss of profit.”379 
The Commentary provides the following illustrations of appropriate damages under 
article 74: 
Example [A]: The contract provided for the sale for $50,000 FOB of 100 machine 
tools which were to be manufactured by the seller.  Buyer repudiated the contract 
prior to the commencement of manufacture of the tools.  If the contract had been 
performed, Seller would have had total costs of $45,000 of which $40,000 would 
have represented costs incurred only because of the existence of this contract 
(e.g., materials, energy, labour hired for the contract or paid by the unit of 
production) and $5,000 would have represented an allocation to this contract of 
the overhead of the firm (cost of borrowed capital, general administrative 
expense, depreciation of plant and equipment).  Because Buyer repudiated [the] 
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contract, Seller did not expend the $40,000 in costs which would have been 
incurred by reason of the existence of this contract.  However, the $5,000 of 
overhead which were allocated to this contract were for expenses of the business 
which were not dependent on the existence of the contract.  Therefore, those 
expenses could not be reduced and, unless the Seller has made other contracts 
which have used his entire productive capacity during the period of time in 
question, as a result of Buyer's breach Seller has lost the allocation of $5,000 to 
overhead which he would have received if the contract had been performed.  
Thus, the loss for which Buyer is liable in this example is $10,000.  
Contract price $50,000 [less] expenses of performance which could be saved 
$40,000 [equals] loss arising out of breach $10,000.  
Example [B]: If, prior to Buyer's repudiation of the contract in Example [A], 
Seller had already incurred $15,000 in non-recoverable expenses in part 
performance of the contract, the total damages would equal $25,000.  
Example [C]: If the product of the part performance in Example [B] could be sold 
as salvage to a third party for $5,000, Seller's loss would be reduced to 
$20,000.380 
Articles 75 and 76 set forth guidelines on how damages are to be calculated in instances 
where the basic measure of damages set forth in Article 74 may not adequately compensate the 
injured party.  Article 75 provides a method for calculating damages when the contract has been 
avoided and the “buyer has bought goods in replacement or the seller has resold the goods.”381 
Here, the claimant “may recover the difference between the contract price and the price in the 
substitute transaction as well as any further damages recoverable under Article 74.”382 However, 
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a claimant may use this method only if the resale or cover purchase was made “in a reasonable 
manner and within a reasonable time after avoidance[.]”383 The purpose of these requirements is 
to prevent the unfairness of having a party pay for loss which the other party caused through 
hasty or malicious conduct. 
 If the contract has been avoided but the injured party has not bought goods in 
replacement or resold the goods under Article 75, then Article 76 provides a different method for 
calculating damages.  It provides that: 
If . . . there is a current price for the goods, the party claiming damages may . . . 
recover the difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current 
price at the time of avoidance as well as any further damages recoverable under 
Article 74.  If, however, the party claiming damages has avoided the contract after 
taking over the goods, the current price at the time of such taking over shall be 
applied instead of the current price at the time of avoidance.384 
The price to be used in determining damages under this article is “the price prevailing at 
the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or, if there is no current price at 
that place, the price at such other place as serves as a reasonable substitute, making due 
allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods.”385 This method of measuring 
damages is called the “market-price-rule.”  It allows the claimant to calculate its damages 
independently from any cover transaction.  If the contract does not fix a price and there is no 
current price within the meaning of Article 76, damages may be calculated under Article 74.386 
Unlike in some civil law countries, the CISG does not limit damages to those situations 
involving a negligent or willful breach.387 However, it excludes damages for death or personal 
injury caused by goods to any person.388   
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Requirements and Limitations. Similar to the practice in many common law and civil 
law countries, the CISG imposes upon the claimant the burden of providing evidence of damage 
and of causation between the breach and the loss suffered.389 Unlike in civil law countries, 
liability for breach of contract is generally strict, and thus no fault has to be shown.390 In 
addition, like many common law and civil law countries, the CISG limits recovery of damages 
pursuant to the doctrines of foreseeability, avoidability and, perhaps certainty. 
 Certainty.  It is unclear whether the CISG contains a certainty requirement.  The CISG 
does not explicitly provide the level of proof needed for a claimant to recover damages.391 To 
date, there has been controversy over whether the issue of certainty is addressed by the 
Convention or whether it is a procedural matter that should be resolved by the domestic law of a 
country in which a dispute governed by the CISG is being decided.  Some courts and tribunals 
have held that the issue is a procedural matter beyond the scope of the Convention and governed 
by the law of the forum,392 while others have held it is a matter governed by the CISG.393 
The standard of proof that has been employed by courts and tribunals deciding damages 
claims under the Convention has varied significantly.  Some courts and tribunals have required a 
specific ascertainment of damages.394 Others have required that they be reasonably 
proved,395and others have required sufficient proof of damages.396 
Causation/Forseeability. The CISG requires that a causal link exist between the breach 
of contract and the loss suffered.397 In addition, Article 74 limits damages for breach of contract 
to those that were “foreseeable.”398 The CISG employs both an objective and subjective test by 
stating that “damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to 
have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in light of the facts and matters of 
which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of 
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contract.”399 The latter (the objective test) asks whether a reasonable party in the same situation 
could expect the loss from its non-performance.400 
The relevant time with respect to determining whether the loss was foreseeable is the 
time that the contract was entered into.  That is, “[t]he facts and matters must have existed at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract and/or must be foreseeable at the conclusion of the 
contract, like seasonal market fluctuations, difficulties in transport caused by bad weather . . . 
.”401 
It is also important to note that Article 74 “gauges foreseeability in terms of possible 
consequences.”402 Thus, a claimant need not show awareness that the loss was a “probable 
result” or a substantial probability,403 only that it was a possible result of the breach.404 
Avoidability.  The CISG also embraces the concept of avoidability.  Article 77 provides: 
“A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in the 
circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach.  If he fails 
to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount 
by which the loss should have been mitigated.” 
 The CISG thus provides that a party must undertake reasonable steps to minimize its loss.  
The mitigation requirement “applies to an anticipatory breach of contract . . . as well as to a 
breach in respect of an obligation the performance of which is currently due.”405 The 
Commentary explains, “[i]f it is clear that one party will commit a fundamental breach of the 
contract, the other party cannot await the contract date of performance before he declares the 
contract avoided and take measures to reduce the loss arising out of the breach by making a 
cover purchase, reselling the goods or otherwise.”406 
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Like in common law and civil law countries, the failure of a party to mitigate its losses 
does not result in liability.  Rather, the failure to mitigate results in the claimant’s damages being 
reduced by the amount which should have been mitigated.407 
The following cases illustrate the awarding of damages under the CISG. In ICC 
Arbitration Award in Case No. 8786 of January 1997, an arbitrator relied on Article 74 of the 
CISG in awarding damages for breach of contract. 408 In the case, hours after being notified that 
the seller, a clothing manufacturer, would not be able to deliver certain seasonal goods to the 
buyer, a retail store, as provided for in the parties’ agreement, the buyer terminated the contract 
under CISG Article 72(1).  That provision states, “[i]f prior to the date for performance of the 
contract it is clear that one of the parties will commit a fundamental breach, the other party may 
declare the contract avoided.”409 The arbitrator determined that the seller’s actions amounted to 
a fundamental breach and that the buyer validly terminated the agreement.  With respect to 
damages, the arbitrator noted that the CISG provided that “[d]amages for breach of contract by 
one party consist of a sum equal to the loss of profit suffered by the other party as a consequence 
of the breach.”410 Based on this provision, the arbitrator ruled that the buyer was entitled to lost 
profits, indirect loss of profits, as well as  expenses incurred as a result of the breach (such as 
travel costs).  The arbitrator then noted that these damages were foreseeable.  The arbitrator 
explained that, with respect to lost profits, the seller “should have known that the goods were to 
be sold in the [buyer’s] retail store and also that the goods were seasonable in nature.  
Accordingly, late delivery would mean that the goods could only be sold for a reduced price 
once they were out of season and therefore profits would be lost.”411 The seller had argued that 
the buyer was not entitled to damages because it failed to take reasonable mitigation measures as  
required by Article 77.  The arbitrator rejected that claim, noting that the seller bore the burden 
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of proof on the issue and it had failed to offer any evidence that the buyer did not take 
appropriate measures to mitigate its loss.412 
In Delchi Carriers v. Rotorex Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed in part an award of damages against an Rotorex, American seller, who provided 
to Delchi Carriers, an Italian manufacturer of air conditioners, compressors that did not conform 
to the terms of the contract between the parties.413 There, the lower court had awarded Delchi 
Carriers lost profits and certain incidental damages. 
 The Second Circuit initially noted that the damages provisions of the CISG, which 
governed the contract, were “designed to place the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the 
other party had properly performed the contract.”414 That is, the provisions protected both the 
claimant’s performance and reliance interests. 
 Turning first to the issue of lost profits, the Second Circuit ruled that Delchi Carriers was 
entitled to lost profits resulting from diminished volume sales.  It affirmed the trial court’s 
findings that Delchi Carriers lost sales as a direct result of Rotorex’s failure to provide 
conforming goods, and that lost profits were a foreseeable consequence of the breach.  
Interestingly, the Second Circuit also agreed with the trial court that Delchi Carriers was only 
entitled to those damages that it could prove with sufficient certainty, even though the CISG 
imposed no such requirement.415 Since the CISG did not address the issue, both the Second 
Circuit and the trial court concluded that the traditional common law damage limitation that the 
claimant must provide sufficient evidence to estimate damages with reasonable certainty should 
apply.416 
With respect to the calculation of lost profits, the Second Circuit noted that the CISG 
was silent on the issue.  As a result, it ruled that the trial court correctly applied the standard 
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formula in the United States for calculating lost profits which, applied to the case, equaled the 
lost sales resulting from Rotorex’s breach multiplied by the average sales price less Delchi 
Carriers’ variable costs.  The Second Circuit ruled that fixed costs should not be deducted from 
the sales revenue in calculating lost profits because such costs would have been encountered 
whether or not the breach occured.417 
Turning to Delchi Carriers’ claims for incidental damages, the Second Circuit noted that 
the trial court had awarded damages to Delchi Carriers to compensate it for costs incurred in: (1) 
attempting to remedy the non-conformity of Rotorex’s compressors, (2) handling and storing the 
rejected compressors, and (3) mitigating its damages by expediting the delivery of compressors 
previously ordered from another supplier.  The Second Circuit affirmed that portion of the award 
based on the principle that an injured party is entitled to damages for the full loss incurred as a 
result of the breach.  The trial court had denied, however, Delchi Carriers damages for: (1) 
shipping, customs and other charges incurred in rejecting and returning the nonconforming 
compressors to Rotorex, (2) materials purchased for use only with Rotorex compressors, and (3) 
the labor costs incurred when the production line was idle because of the lack of compressors to 
install in air conditioning units.  The trial court ruled that these costs were accounted for in 
Delchi’s claims for lost profits.  The Second Circuit disagreed.  It noted that these costs were 
reasonably foreseeable and legitimate incidental or consequential damages, and that the lost 
profits award would not compensate Delchi Carriers for those expenses.  It explained: 
An award of lost profits will not compensate Delchi for the expenses in question.  
Delchi’s lost profits are determined by calculating the hypothetical revenues 
derived from unmade sales less hypothetical variable costs that would have been, 
but were not incurred.  This figure, however, does not compensate for costs 
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actually incurred that led to no sales.  Thus, to award damages for costs actually 
incurred in no way creates double recovery and instead furthers the purpose of 
giving the injured party damages “equal to the loss.”418 
The court noted, however, that it was unclear whether labor costs were fixed or variable costs.  
As a result, it stated that Delchi Carriers would be entitled to be reimbursed for labor costs only 
if, on remand, the trial court was able to determine that its labor expenses were incurred only as a 
result of the breach.419 
V.  THE AWARDING OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT UNDER GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 
Some international tribunals have resolved claims for damages for breach of contract on 
general principles, such as those contained in the UNIDROIT Principles of International and 
Commercial Contracts, or on principles of equity.420 Those principles are typically based on 
rules found in national laws. 
A. The UNIDROIT Principles 
The UNIDROIT Principles of International and Commercial Contracts set forth general 
rules for international commercial contracts.421 They may be applied when the parties have 
agreed that the contract shall be governed by the Principles or when the contract is to be 
interpreted in accordance with general principles of law, including lex mercatoria. They also 
may be used to interpret or supplement existing international instruments, such as the CISG.422 
Like the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles provide that a party to a contract who has been 
aggrieved by the other party’s non-performance of its obligations has a right to compensation for 
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the full amount of the loss it suffered as a result of the breach.423 In other words, the goal of the 
damages provisions of the UNDROIT Principles is to protect a claimant’s performance interest. 
 The scope of damages that a claimant may recover for breach of contract is broader under 
the UNIDROIT Principles than under the CISG.  Like the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles 
explicitly provide for the recovery of lost profits.424 But unlike the CISG, UNIDROIT Principles 
also explicitly provide for non-pecuniary loss such as physical suffering or emotional distress.425 
If, after the breach of contract, the claimant makes a replacement transaction, Article 
7.4.5 of the UNIDROIT Principles measures the claimant’s damages as the difference between 
the contract price and the current price of the goods at the time the contract is terminated, as well 
as damages for any further harm.  This provision is similar to CISG Article 75.  Like in the 
CISG, Article 7.4.5 requires the replacement transaction to have been made within a reasonable 
time and in a reasonable manner.426 
If, after the breach of contract, the claimant terminates the contract but does not make a 
replacement transaction, the UNIDROIT Principles Article 7.4.6 provides that the claimant may 
recover the difference between the contract price and the current price of the goods at the time 
the contract is terminated, as well as damages for any further harm, provided that there exists 
such a current price.427 The “[c]urrent price is the price generally charged for goods or services 
rendered in comparable circumstances at the place where the contract should have been 
performed or, if there is no current price at that place, the current price at such other place that 
appears reasonable to take as a reference.”428 The Comment to Article 7.4.6 states that the 
current price “will often, but not necessarily, be the price on an organized market.”429 In 
addition, “the place relevant for determining the current price is that where the contract should 
have been performed or, if there is no current price at that place, the place that appears 
62
reasonable to take as a reference.”430 The remedy provided by Article 7.4.6 is similar to CISG 
Article 76. 
 The UNIDROIT Principles limit the right to damages in a variety of ways.  Article 7.4.7, 
for example, limits the right to damages if the claimant has contributed to the harm.  It states: 
“[w]here the harm is due in part to an act or omission of the aggrieved party or to another event 
as to which that party bears the risk, the amount of damages shall be reduced to the extent that 
these factors have contributed to the harm, having regard to the conduct of each of the 
parties.”431 
The UNIDROIT Principles also limit damages through the familiar concepts of causation, 
foreseeability, certainty and avoidability. 
 Causation/Foreseeability. The UNIDROIT Principles provide that “[t]he non-
performing party is liable only for harm which it foresaw or could reasonably have foreseen at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract as being likely to result from its non-performance.”432 
Like the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles contain both subjective and objective tests for 
foreseeability.  However, in contrast to the CISG which requires that the foreseeable harm be a 
“possible” consequence of the non-performance of the contract, the UNIDROIT Principles state 
that such harm must be a “likely” result of the breach.433 Thus, the UNIDROIT Principles 
appear to take a slightly more restrictive view on foreseeability than the CISG. 
 The Comment to the UNIDROIT Principles explains that the concept of foreseeability 
relates to the nature or type of harm and not to its extent, unless the extent transforms the harm 
into one of a different kind.434 It also makes clear that the requirement of foreseeability goes 
hand-in-hand with the requirement of certainty.435 Thus, a claimant is required to show that “it 
must have been foreseeable that harm with certainty (is likely) to flow from such a breach.”436 
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Furthermore, the Comment clarifies that, unlike some civil law systems, a respondent is not 
liable for unforeseeable harm even if the breach was willful.437 Finally, the Comment states: 
What is foreseeable is to be determined by reference to the time of the conclusion 
of the contract and to the non-performing party itself (including its servants or 
agents), and the test is what a normally diligent person could have reasonably 
have foreseen as the consequence of non-performance in the ordinary course of 
things and the particular circumstances of the contract, such as the information 
supplied by the parties or their previous transactions.438 
Certainty. The UNIDROIT Principles provide that “[c]ompensation is due only for harm, 
including future harm, that is established with a reasonable degree of certainty.”439 If the 
claimant cannot establish the amount of damages with sufficient certainty, the UNIDROIT 
Principles state that the tribunal would have the discretion to set the amount.440 The UNIDROIT 
Principles also allow recovery of damages for the loss of chance in proportion to the probability 
of its occurrence.441 
Avoidability. Article 7.4.8 of the UNIDROIT Principles precludes recovery for any harm 
that the claimant could have avoided by taking reasonable steps.442 The Comment explains that 
“[t]he purpose of this article is to avoid the aggrieved party passively sitting back and waiting to 
be compensated for harm which it could have avoided or reduced.”443 
Under the UNIDROIT Principles, the claimant need not undertake mitigation measures 
that are unduly time-consuming and costly.  Rather, the claimant is required to undertake 
reasonable efforts to limit the extent of the harm or to avoid an increase in the initial harm.444 
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If the claimant fails to undertake the required mitigation measures, its damages will be 
reduced proportionately.  That is, its damages are reduced to the extent of the loss that could 
have been avoided by taking reasonable steps.445 
Article 7.4.8 also provides that “[t]he aggrieved party is entitled to recover any expenses 
reasonably incurred in attempting to reduce the harm.”446 
The following cases illustrate the awarding of damages under the UNIDROIT Principles.  
In Arbitral Award No. A-1795/51, an arbitral tribunal relied on the UNIDROIT Principles in 
awarding claimant damages for breach of an agency agreement.447 The tribunal noted that 
Articles 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 “affirm an aggrieved party’s right to full compensation for the harm it 
sustained as a result of the other party’s non-performance but exclude compensation for 
emotional suffering and distress, the aggrieved party being a corporate entity.”448 It also relied 
upon Articles 7.4.3 (certainty of harm) and 7.4.4 (forseeability of harm) to exclude certain costs 
sought by the claimant, including the purchase of a house where the agency contract was to be 
performed.449 
In Arbitral Award No. 8502, an ICC panel applied UNIDROIT Principles Article 7.4.6 to 
determine the amount owed to the claimant (a Dutch buyer) as the result of the respondent’s (a 
Vietnamese seller’s) breach of its contract for the sale of rice.450 The tribunal ruled that, under 
Article 7.4.6, the claimant was entitled to the difference between the contract price and the 
relevant market price.  With respect to determining the relevant market price, the tribunal 
concluded that it should be the market price at the place where the delivery of goods should have 
been made, which was specified in the contract as being Ho Chi Minh City.451 
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B. Principles of European Contract Law 
The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) were drafted and promulgated by the 
Commission on European Contract Law, a body of lawyers consisting of individuals from every 
member State of the European Union.452 The PECL were promulgated by the Commission in 
“response to a need for a Union-wide infrastructure of contract law to consolidate the rapidly 
expanding volume of Community law regulating specific types of contract.”453 They are 
analogous to model laws in the United States, in that they are not enforceable law, but rather are 
a model law that may be adopted as law by the European Union or even the member states (or 
future member states) of the European Union, much like the Uniform Commercial Code in the 
United States.454 Moreover, the PECL were also promulgated by the Commission so that parties 
from different States could expressly adopt them to govern international contracts.455 Finally, 
the Commission promulgated the PECL with the long-term goal of “harmonis[ing]” contract law 
throughout the Member States of the European Union.456 In drafting the Principles, the 
Commission members were influenced by the national laws of every Member State of the 
European Union.457 The drafters were also influenced by legal materials from within as well as 
outside Europe.458 
The goal of the damages provisions of the PECL, like the CISG and the UNIDROIT 
Principles, is protecting a claimant’s performance interest.  Article 9:502 states: “[t]he general 
measure of damages is such sum as will put the aggrieved party as nearly as possible into the 
position in which it would have been if the contract had been duly performed.  Such damages 
cover the loss which the aggrieved party has suffered and the gain of which it has been 
deprived.”459 
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In addition to providing recovery for actual loss and the loss of future profits,460 the 
PECL, like the UNIDROIT Principles, provide for recovery of non-pecuniary loss such as pain 
and suffering, inconvenience and mental distress.461 The PECL also allow recovery for damages 
for loss of chance462 and loss of goodwill.463 Although the PECL do not explicitly state that any 
loss suffered by the claimant after a breach of contract must be offset by any gain to the claimant 
caused by the breach of contract, the Comment to Article 9:502 does.464 
If the claimant makes a substitute transaction after the breach of contract, Article 9:506 of 
the PECL provides that the claimant may recover the difference between the original contract 
price and the price of the substitute transaction, as well as any further loss.465 Like the CISG and 
UNIDROIT Principles, the PECL require that the substitute transaction have been made in a 
reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after the breach.466 
If the claimant does not make a substitute transaction after a breach of contract, the PECL 
provide that the claimant may recover the difference between the contract price and the current 
price of the contracted-for goods or services as well as any further loss.  The PECL measure the 
current price of the goods or services as the price at the time the contract was terminated.  
Although both the CISG and UNIDROIT state the location at which the current price of goods is 
to be determined, the PECL do not.467 
The PECL limit the right of the claimant to seek damages in a variety of ways.  Article 
9:504, like Article 7.4.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles, limits a claimant’s right to damages if the 
claimant contributed to the breach of contract.468 According to the Comment to Article 9:504, 
not only is a claimant precluded from collecting damages for non-performance to which it 
contributed, but a claimant is also precluded from collecting damages for additional loss after a 
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non-performance for which it was not responsible if it exacerbates the adverse effects of the non-
performance.469 
Like the UNIDROIT Principles and the CISG, the PECL also limit damages through the 
customary concepts of causation, certainty, foreseeability and avoidability. 
 Causation/Foreseeability.  The PECL provide that “the aggrieved party may not recover 
damages for loss not caused by the failure to perform.”470 If the respondent claims that an 
intervening unforeseeable event occurred that should preclude it from being liable for non-
performance, the PECL provide that the question, “whether that event would have had an impact 
on the contract if the failure in performance had not occurred,” must be answered in the 
affirmative in order to deem an event something that breaks the chain of causation.471 
Certainty.  Unlike the UNIDROIT Principles which explicitly require that damages be 
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, the PECL discuss certainty only in a note, stating 
that most systems “generally require a sufficient degree of ‘certainty’ of loss” in order to award 
damages, but this is not to be taken literally.472 
Foreseeability. Like the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles, the PECL provide for the 
use of both subjective and objective tests of foreseeability.473 The PECL, like the UNIDROIT 
Principles, also appear to take a slightly more restrictive view on foreseeability than the CISG 
stating that the harm caused by the breach of contract must have been the “likely” result of the 
breach.474 In contrast to both the CISG and UNIDROIT, the PECL provide an exception to the 
foreseeability requirement, allowing the claimant the right to recover unforeseeable damages in 
the event that the nonperformance of the respondent was intentional or grossly negligent.”475 
The comment to the PECL supplies an illustration of an intentional breach where unforeseeable, 
but nevertheless, recoverable damages occurred: 
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A contracts with B to construct and erect stands for a major exhibition at which 
leading electronic firms will display their equipment, hiring the stands from B.  A 
week before the exhibition is due to open A demands a substantial increase in the 
contract sum.  B refuses to pay, pointing out that A’s failure to complete the 
remaining stands will not only cost B revenue but expose it to heavy liability to an 
exhibitor C, which intended to use the exhibition to launch a major new product.  
A nevertheless withdraws its workforce, with the result that C’s stand is not ready 
in time and it claims substantial compensation from B.  A’s breach being 
intentional and with knowledge of the likely consequences, the court has to award 
B an indemnity in respect of its liability to C, even though A could not reasonably 
have foreseen the magnitude of such liability at the time it made its contract with 
B.  The same may be done even if A was not aware of the serious consequences 
for B of the intentional breach.476 
Avoidability. According to Article 9:505, the respondent is not liable for losses suffered 
by the claimant if the claimant could have mitigated its losses.477 A claimant can fail to mitigate 
its losses in two ways: 1) if the claimant incurs unnecessary or unreasonable expenditure; or 2) if 
the claimant fails to take reasonable steps which would reduce its loss or offset its gains.478 The 
claimant, however, is not expected to go above and beyond the call of duty and is only expected 
to take reasonable steps to mitigate its losses.479 The claimant is also expected to refrain from 
taking steps that are unreasonable.480 
Like under the UNIDROIT Principles and the CISG, the claimant may recover any 
expenses it incurred in mitigating its losses.481 Finally, even if the claimant takes steps beyond 
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what is reasonably expected and subsequently reduces its losses, the reduction in its losses will 
still be accounted for in awarding damages.482 
C. Damages Decided Ex Aequo Et Bono 
Sometimes a tribunal will decline to select a particular law to be applied to a contractual 
dispute, and instead base its decision on principles of fairness.  This approach, however, is only 
used when the tribunal has the power to decide ex aequo et bono.  The arbitral tribunal’s decision 
in Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co. illustrates this practice.483 
In Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd., the respondent, National Iranian Oil Company, 
breached a concession agreement with the claimant after the claimant had begun exploring for oil 
under the contract, but before the start of any drilling, exaction or sale. With respect to damages, 
the arbitrator noted that it is well recognized by international tribunals that a wrongful breach of 
contract entitles the injured party to the benefit of the bargain.  In theory, this allows the claimant 
to recover money for actual loss incurred as a result of the breach and any net gains prevented.  
The arbitrator explained this principle as follows: 
According to the generally held view, the object of damages is to place the party 
to whom they are awarded in the same pecuniary position that they would have 
been in if the contract had been performed in the manner provided for by the 
parties at the time of its conclusion. . . . This rule is simply a direct deduction 
from the principle of pacta sunt servanda, since its only effect is to substitute a 
pecuniary obligation for the obligation which was promised but not performed.  It 
is therefore natural that the creditor should thereby be given full compensation.  
This compensation includes loss suffered (damnum emergens), for example 
expenses incurred in performing the contract, and the profit lost (lucrum cessans), 
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for example the net profit which the contract would have produced.  The award of 
compensation for lost profit or the loss of a possible benefit has been frequently 
allowed by international tribunals.484 
With respect to damnum emergens, the arbitrator ruled that the claimant was entitled to 
expenses incurred in performing the contract, such as the cost of exploration, certain registration 
fees the claimant had paid, and the amount of a letter of credit wrongfully cashed by the 
respondent.  With respect to lucrum cessans, the arbitrator noted that, because the contract had 
been terminated at an early stage of exploration, both the commercial quantities and damages 
were uncertain.  The claimant’s claim was thus akin to a loss of a chance to discover oil.  The 
claimant’s expert opined that if the contract had not been breached, in the best case scenario, the 
claimant would have made US$46 million and in the worst case (i.e., if there were no 
commercial quantities of oil), it would have lost US$8 million.  Fixing the quantity ex aequo et 
bono by considering all circumstances, including accounting for risks such as the possibility of 
wars and price recession, the arbitrator awarded claimant US$2 million in lost profits. 
VI. TRIBUNAL AWARDS 
Tribunals deciding transnational contract disputes typically do not have much difficulty 
in determining whether a claimant is entitled to damages once they have found that there has 
been a wrongful breach of contract.  Rather, it is the calculation of damages and, in particular, 
the determination of lost profits, that has proved to be a complex process resulting in different 
approaches and seemingly arbitrary awards. 
 Today, it is well recognized by international tribunals that a wrongful breach of contract 
entitles the injured party to the benefit of the bargain.485 In theory, this allows the claimant to 
recover money for actual loss incurred as a result of the breach and any net gains prevented.486 
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In evaluating a claim for damages, a tribunal usually first looks to the applicable law to 
determine the requirements for awarding damages, such as foreseeability and avoidability.487 If 
these requirements are met, the tribunal then turns to calculating the damages.488 
The cases that are most troublesome for tribunals deciding disputes between transnational 
contracting parties typically involve damages claims for lost profits.  Some tribunals view claims 
for lost profits as being speculative and have required a higher standard of proof with respect to 
such claims when applicable law is not explicit on the subject.489 For example, one panel 
deciding a claim for lost profit in an investment dispute stated that in order for such damages to 
be awarded the claimant must provide “detailed factual description of the circumstances of the 
claimed loss, damage or injury.”490 
Claims for lost profits in cases involving breaches of long term contracts may also raise 
special problems for tribunals.  This is particularly true in those situations where the 
respondent’s breach has not just injured the claimant’s business, but destroyed it, and the tribunal 
must determine the value lost.  Determining these damages in this situation can be particularly 
difficult because tribunals must calculate damages based on projected future earnings that may 
be greatly affected by ever-changing and often unpredictable economic circumstances, such as 
interest rates and energy prices.  The most common approaches that tribunals have used to 
determine damages in this circumstance are the book value method, the replacement value 
method, and the discounted cash flow method (DCF).491 
The book value method calls for the tribunal to measure the going concern by reference 
to its costs.  The book value method has been criticized as not accurately reflecting the value lost 
because it is based on historic and not actual costs, does not account for intangible assets, and  
fails to take into account the future profitability of the business.492 
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The replacement value method requires a tribunal to set damages at the market value of 
similar properties or entities. The problem with this method is that that there may be no 
comparable businesses or opportunities to which a tribunal may look to in calculating 
damages.493 
The DCF method determines the value of the business by projecting the net cash flow for 
a certain time period into the future and then discounting it back to present value as of the date of 
the breach.  It uses a discount rate that may include an inflation component and a risk factor.494 
Because the DCF method values the asset lost according to its income producing capabilities, in 
theory, it fully compensates the claimant by awarding an amount that reflects both the loss 
incurred and gain of which it was deprived.495 The report of an expert witness in Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Iran explained the DCF method as follows: 
Standard economic theory holds that market value of an asset equals its expected 
future cash flows discounted to present value at the opportunity cost of capital . . .  
An assets’ market value stems from its expected ability to generate cash returns 
over time.  Market value ultimately depends on the amount, timing, and risk of 
future cash flows.  Prompt, safe cash flows are naturally more valuable than 
delayed, risky ones. 
The relation of future cash flows to current market value is expressed in the 
discounted cash flow formula, in which forecasted cash flows are discounted to 
obtain present value.  The appropriate discount rate is the opportunity cost of 
capital, that is, the expected rate of return from investing in other assets of 
equivalent risk . . . .496 
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The problem with the DCF method is that it is difficult to apply.  Currently, there are no 
universal rules for determining the future cash flows of a business or setting an appropriate 
discount rate.497 The first task requires projecting the company’s earnings based on a wide 
variety of factors, including the company’s past earnings history, its projected outlook, and the 
industry outlook, all of which necessarily involve many assumptions, estimates and other 
subjective elements.498 The second task, setting the discount rate, requires an even more 
complex calculation that takes into account multiple variables, including the expected rate of 
inflation, the real rate of return, and the riskiness of the income stream.499 Accordingly, parties 
often employ experts to make a DCF valuation, and tribunals sometimes employ their own 
experts to assist in evaluating the parties’ claims concerning lost profits using the DCF 
method.500 Nevertheless, the lack of clear rules for determining the most important factors used 
in the DCF method has caused one commentator to remark that “[d]amages in complex 
businesses relying on calculation of future cash flows (quite speculative) discounted to present 
value by applying a specific discount rate (itself very uncertain as the risk factor added to the 
risk-free discount rate is inevitably highly subjective) can be reasonably and plausibly 
determined within a very wide range.”501 Others have called the DCF analysis as more of an art 
form than a science.502 
Not surprisingly, awards using the DCF methods sometimes seem arbitrary.503 In fact, in 
one case, the tribunal appeared to “split the baby,” setting damages exactly halfway between the 
claimant’s and respondent’s valuations.504 In other cases, tribunals have struggled with the DCF 
method, leading to inconsistent applications. 
 In ICC Case No. 5946, the tribunal determined that the duration of the income projection 
should last for the entire term of the contract, which was 40 months.505 By contrast, in Final 
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Award in Case No. 7006, the tribunal calculated lost profits based on an income stream for one 
year after the contract was breached because it felt that the claimant could have mitigated its 
losses after that time.506 
A number of tribunals have refused to award damages consisting of lost profits where the 
business was not a going concern.507 These tribunals reason that because the business did not 
have a sufficient earning history, determining lost profits in such circumstances would be too 
speculative. 
 For example, in Levitt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Chamber One of the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal ruled that Iran breached its contract for the construction of a housing project and 
awarded the claimant his expenses incurred as a result of the breach.508 Although the tribunal 
recognized that, in principle, lost profits may be awarded in the case of a breach of contract, it 
denied the claim for such profits.  The tribunal reasoned: 
[T]he basis for the [lost profits] claim . . . is highly speculative. . . . By the time 
the Contract came to an end only initial stages of clearing and grading had been 
completed, and no construction work had begun on buildings.  The project 
therefor reached only an early stage. . . . For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that 
the Claimant has not established with a sufficient degree of certainty that the 
project would have resulted in profit.509 
By contrast, other tribunals have awarded lost profits even where the business that has 
been destroyed is not a going concern.510 For example, in the Sapphire arbitration, the arbitrator 
ruled that the claimant was entitled to lost profits for the breach of an oil concession even though 
the area that was the subject of the concession had not yet been prospected.  The arbitrator 
explained: 
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It is not necessary to prove the exact damage suffered in order to award damages.  
On the contrary, when such proof is impossible, particularly as a result of the 
behaviour of the author of the damage, it is enough for the judge to be able to 
admit with sufficient probability the existence of the damage.511 
The arbitrator relied on an expert’s report and testimony and ruled that the claimant met this 
burden of showing sufficient probability of success of the prospecting if the breach had not 
occurred.  With respect to the amount of lost profits owed, the arbitrator noted that the claimant’s 
expert provided only a rough estimate of the loss.  However, this was not fatal to the claimant’s 
claim.  The arbitrator had been given the authority to decide ex aequo et bono and thus 
concluded that he had wide discretion to fix the amount of lost profits, even though the extent 
and existence of the amount of lost profits were not certain.  The arbitrator awarded US$2 
million for lost profits, stating that that amount was both “reasonable and equitable.”512 
Recently, tribunals have dealt with an emerging issue: the invocation of the abuse of 
rights doctrine to deny lost profits, even though the non-breaching party is entitled to such profits 
under the contract.  This issue arose in the now controversial decision of Himpurna California 
Energy Ltd. v. P.T. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara.513 There, Himpurna California 
Energy Ltd. entered into a contract with the Indonesian state electricity corporation, PLN, to 
explore and develop geothermal resources in Indonesia, including building two power plants in 
the country and selling the power generated to PLN.  When PLN failed to purchase the energy 
Himpurna generated, Himpurna submitted a request for arbitration, claiming that PLN breached 
the contract, thus causing US$2.3 billion in damages.  An ad hoc arbitral tribunal agreed that 
PLN breached its contract with Himpurna.514 
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Turning to the issue of damages, the tribunal initially noted that under the Indonesian 
Civil Code, the applicable substantive law, damages may include “the loss which the creditor has 
suffered and the profit he has been made to forego.”515 In this case, Himpurna claimed both 
damnum emergens, which consisted of capital invested and expended plus interest, and lucrum 
cessans, which amounted to its expected future revenue stream, discounted to reflect the time 
value of money and the risk premium. 
 With respect to damnum emergens, the tribunal stated that Himpurna was entitled to 
reimbursement for monies that Himpurna could prove that it spent in reliance on the contract.516 
As a result, the tribunal awarded Himpurna as damnum emergens US$273,757,306.517 
Regarding the claim for lucrum cessans, the tribunal looked to the applicable law, noting: 
Art. 1246 of the Indonesian Civil Code – echoing its precursor Art. 1149 of the 
French Code civil – provides for the recovery of lost profit. . . . But the code goes 
on to set out limiting factors which, again, are quite familiar.  Art. 1247 
(congruent with Art. 1152 of the Code civil) restricts recovery to damages 
foreseeable at the time of contracting; and Art. 1248 (congruent with Art. 1284 of 
the Code civil) requires that damages be the “immediate and direct result of the 
breach.”518 
While the tribunal recognized that Himpurna was in principle entitled to lost profits, it 
ruled that the calculation of these profits should not be performed in a way that would 
impoverish the host state.  To do so, the tribunal stated, would constitute an “abuse of right.”  
According to the tribunal, the abuse of rights doctrine is a general principle of international law 
that requires parties to observe good faith in the exercise of their rights.  As a principle of 
international law, the tribunal stated, the doctrine overrides the right to the benefit of the bargain 
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under substantive law.  The tribunal explained “that this is a case where the doctrine of abuse of 
right must be applied in favour of PLN to prevent the claimant’s undoubtedly legitimate rights 
from being extended beyond tolerable norms, on the ground that it would be intolerable in the 
present case to uphold claims for lost profits from investment not yet incurred.”519 The tribunal 
thus refused to calculate lost profits “as though the claimant had an unfettered right to create 
ever-increasing losses for the State of Indonesia (and its people) by generating energy without 
regard to whether or not PLN had any use for it[,] [e]ven if such right may be said to have 
derive[d] from explicit contractual terms.”520 Accordingly, it awarded Himpurna 
US$117,244,000 in lost profits, which was less than 10% of the amount claimed.  The tribunal 
settled on this amount by calculating Himpurna’s after-tax net cash flow projections, discounted 
to the present value applying a discount rate [19%] that took into account the perceived risks of 
the project, and by limiting the recoverable profits to 36% of the total claim for lost profits (so as 
to exclude lost profits on investments not yet made).521 
Similarly, in Patuha Power Ltd.. v. PT. Persero Perusahaan Listruik Negara, an arbitral 
tribunal encountered another case arising from Indonesia’s breach of an agreement for the 
exploration and development of geothermal resources.  The tribunal denied the claim for lost 
profits on the ground that it would be an abuse of rights to award millions in lost profits in light 
of the state of the economy in Indonesia.522 
By contrast, in Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Das Gas Bumi 
Negara, a third arbitration arising from failed power projects in Indonesia, the tribunal awarded 
the claimant lost profits.523 There, Karaha Bodas Co. (“KBC”) entered into a contract with 
Pertamina, the Indonesia state owned oil company, to finance, build and operate geothermal 
facilities in the Karaha area of Indonesia, and Pertamina agreed to buy energy generated by 
78
KBC.  Indonesia subsequently suspended the projects because of the country’s financial crisis. 
KBC filed for arbitration, seeking (1) a declaration that the contracts were terminated, (2) 
damages of US$96 million for expenditures already made on the projects, and (3) US$512 
million for the present value of expected future profits over the life of the contract.524 The 
tribunal determined that Pertamina had breached its agreements with KBC and awarded KBC 
US$111.1 million for lost expenditures and US$150 million for lost profits.525 
Karaha Bodas subsequently filed actions to enforce the award in the United States, as 
well as in Hong Kong and Canada.526 The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Texas ordered the enforcement of the award, and that order was affirmed by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  In both courts, Pertamina claimed that enforcement 
should be denied because, inter alia, the damage award was contrary to public policy.527 
Specifically, Pertamina argued that the “award of lost profits in this particular case, when KBC 
never finished the project and the Indonesian economy was in ruins, constitutes an abuse of 
rights in violation of public policy.”528 Both courts rejected that argument.  The Fifth Circuit 
noted that the abuse of rights doctrine was not well established in American law.  Furthermore, it 
stated that an action violates the abuse of rights doctrine only if one of the following three factors 
is present: 
(1) the predominant motive for the action is to cause harm; (2) the action is totally 
unreasonable given the lack of any legitimate interest in the exercise of the right 
and its exercise harms another; and (3) the right is exercised for the purpose other 
than that for which it exists.529 
It concluded that none of the factors were present in the instant case.530 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In most countries, the primary purpose of damages for a breach of contract is to place the 
claimant in the position it would have been in had the contract been performed.  Based upon this 
principle, the laws in most countries provide that a respondent that has unlawfully failed to 
perform its contractual obligations is liable for actual losses suffered by the claimant as a result 
of the breach, as well as any net gains prevented.  Although countries lack a common language 
for identifying these concepts, the concepts are functionally the same from country to country. 
 All countries place limitations on damages for breach of contract, although they vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  The most common limitations are that a claimant may only 
recover losses that were directly caused by the respondent’s breach and that were foreseeable as 
a probable result of the breach.  Many countries also preclude the claimant from recovering 
losses that it could have prevented through mitigation.  Some jurisdictions also limit recovery to 
those damages which can be proven with reasonable certainty. 
 Many civil law countries also require as a prerequisite to the recovery of damages that the 
respondent be at fault in breaching the agreement.  This typically means that the respondent’s 
breach must have been willful or negligent.  In contrast, most common law countries do not 
impose such a requirement. 
 The study further finds that while most countries provide for the awarding of lost profits 
in the event of a breach of contract, the requirements for their recovery vary among countries.  In 
general, lost profits are more difficult to obtain in civil law countries because many of these 
countries impose a high standard of proof for their recovery. 
 Like the laws of most countries, the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL 
provide that if the respondent fails to perform its contractual obligation, the claimant may 
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recover the full amount of the loss it suffered, including lost profits.  One significant difference 
between the three is that the CISG does not allow the recovery of non-pecuniary loss, such as 
emotional distress, while the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL do.  Also, like many 
countries, the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL require that the claimant’s loss 
must have been foreseeable and preclude recovery of losses the claimant could have avoided by 
mitigation. 
 Some tribunals have awarded damages for breach of contract based on principles of 
equity.  In such situations, they may award damnum emergens, lucrum cessans, or both. 
 In light of national laws, conventions, and general principles of international law and 
equity, there has been an almost universal consensus among tribunals deciding disputes between 
transnational contracting parties that the goal of damages for breach of contract is to place the 
injured party in the position that it would have been in had the contract been performed.  
Consequently, tribunals recognize that the aggrieved party is typically entitled to recover both 
losses incurred as well as gains of which it was deprived because of the breach. 
 However, the calculation of damages and, in particular lost profits, has proved more 
troublesome for courts and tribunals deciding international contract disputes.531 This result 
should not come as a surprise.  The laws of most countries provide little or no guidance on how 
lost profits should be calculated.  Indeed, most countries simply give the judge or jury broad 
discretion to fix damages, including lost profits.532 In addition, the assessment of lost profits is 
not an exact science.  Moreover, some of the methods used to calculate lost profits are 
complicated.533 In particular, the DCF method is especially complex because it determines the 
value of the business by projecting the net cash flow for a certain time period into the future and 
then discounting it back to present value as of the date of the breach (taking into account inter 
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alia inflation and risk).  Accordingly, awards of damages by tribunals deciding transnational 
contract disputes have varied greatly.  However, this is not in-and-of-itself a cause for concern.  
As one tribunal explained: 
There is no reason to apologise for the fact that [the approach used to calculate 
damages] involves approximations; they are inherent and inevitable.  Nor can it 
be criticised as unrealistic or unbusinesslike; it is precisely how business 
executives must, and do, proceed when they evaluate a going concern.  The fact 
that they use ranges and estimates does not imply abandonment of the discipline 
of economic analysis; nor, when adopted by arbitrators, does this method imply 
abandonment of the discipline of assessing the evidence before them.534 
Finally, there are steps that the parties can undertake to assist tribunal in determining 
awards of damages.  For example, parties can set forth in their contract how damages are to be 
calculated in the event of a wrongful breach of contract, provided it does not amount to a penalty 
that may not be enforced in some countries.  Alternatively, parties may consider using final offer 
arbitration with respect to the amount of any award of damages.  In this context, this approach 
calls for each party to propose to the tribunal the amount of damages that the claimant is entitled 
to; the tribunal would then choose between the two totals.  (This procedure would only apply if 
the tribunal determined that the respondent was liable to the claimant for damages.)  The 
advantage of this process is that it forces parties to be more reasonable in their positions (or more 
realistic in their assessment of their positions) and, in theory, should narrow the differences 
between the parties concerning the amount of damages owed.  In fact, this  procedure also may 
facilitate settlement of the dispute.  As one commentator explains: 
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When the only dispute between parties is a numeric value [as in final offer 
arbitration], reasonable final offers provide a midpoint and a range of numbers on 
which to focus negotiations.  Each side can assess the likelihood that the arbitrator 
will value the disputed item as worth more or less than the midpoint.  This 
analysis helps the parties predict which offer the arbitrator will choose. . . . [T]his 
midpoint analysis promotes settlement.  Close final offers usually settle because a 
compromise number is easy to reach.  Final offers which are far apart often settle 
as well because each side fears that the arbitrator will choose the other’s offer.535 
Tribunals also may consider a greater use of experts to assist in evaluating claims for 
damages.536 Employing experts may help the tribunal better understand the complexities 
involved in calculating damages and thus may lead to a more reasoned decision.537 The authors 
of one of the leading treatises on international arbitration explain: 
In international commercial arbitration, the arbitration tribunal is usually 
composed of lawyers.  Where matters of a specialist or technical nature arise, 
such an arbitral tribunal often needs expert assistance in reaching its conclusions, 
in order “to obtain any technical information that might guide it in the search for 
truth. . . .”   For example, . . . [e]xpert help may be needed to investigate the 
quantification of a claim.538 
Of course, the drawbacks are that employing experts may increase the cost of  resolving the 
dispute and may slow the process.  These potential drawbacks may be outweighed by the 
benefits, especially when substantial sums are involved.539 
Tribunals also should be mindful that, where the claimant seeks both damnum emergens 
and the lucrum cessans, they need to be careful to avoid double counting so that they give the 
83
claimant the benefit of the bargain and no more.540 The potential for double recovery is 
especially great when the applicable law provides for the recovery of damnum emergens and the 
lucrum cessans, and the tribunal employs the DCF method to calculate damages.  As one tribunal 
explained: 
[F]uture net cash flow generally includes all amortization of investment there will 
ever be.  To ask for the full amount of the future revenue stream when also 
claiming recoupment of all investment is wanting your cake and eating it too.  If 
the DCF method is applied in a contractual scenario to measure nothing but net 
cash flow (thus excluding the accrual accounting notion of ‘income’ which may 
cover non-cash items such as depreciation), there is no room for recovery of 
wasted costs.  In other words, when the victim of the breach of contract seeks 
recovery of sunken costs, confident that it is entitled to its damnum, it may go on 
to seek lost profits only with the proviso that its computations reduce future net 
cash flows by allowing a proper measure of amortization.541 
Thus, in general, a claimant should not be able to receive as damages for breach of contract both 
the recovery of the value of its lost assets (as damnum emergens) and lost profits measured by 
the discounted present value of future cash flows (as lucrum cessans) because, in such case, “the 
expenses of making the contract . . . is an element included in the compensation for loss of 
profit.”542 Damages should, to the extent possible, place the aggrieved party in the same 
pecuniary position that it would have been in if the contract had not been breached; not a better 
position than if the contract had been performed. 
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